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“[T]he traditional concept of participation in a higher order 
is not so subtly transposed into a deism in which God 
supplies the material but man supplies the concrete norms.” 
Russell Hittinger, The First Grace 
 
“The pain and the shock are at most a warning and a symptom.  
The real objection is that if man chooses to treat himself as raw 
material, raw material he will be: not raw material to be  
manipulated, as he fondly imagined, by himself, but by  
mere appetite, that is, mere Nature, in the person of his 
de-humanizing Conditioners.  We have been trying, like Lear, 
to have it both ways: to lay down our human prerogative and yet 
at the same time to retain it.  It is impossible.  Either we are 
rational spirit obliged for ever to obey the absolute values of the 
Tao, or else we are mere nature to be kneaded and cut into new  
shapes for the pleasures of masters who must, by hypothesis, have  
no motive but their own ‘natural’ impulses.  Only the Tao provides 
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a common human law of action which can over-arch rulers 
and ruled alike.” 
C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man  
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My topic is the place of “higher law” in the ordinary practice of 
law, and what I shall argue is, first, that it is to be encouraged, including 
sometimes as a direct judicial contribution, in ways and to an extent that 
can be roughly delimited; and, second, that it ordinarily amounts – or 
should amount—to a less flashy affair than is sometimes supposed.  
Taking the side of higher—or natural—law today makes for strange 
bedfellows and odd crossovers between liberals and conservatives, but, as 
I shall argue, a recovery of the genuine higher law tradition is what those 
who care about human rights need above all else.  And who can afford not 
to care about human rights?  Or imagine that they amount to nothing more 
than transitory artifacts of our practical agenda?      
At first blush, it would seem that conservatives, usually regarded 
as the faithful (if benighted) transmitters of the fruits of the central western 
tradition of reflection on the human situation, would be higher law’s 
natural allies.  Conservatives do like to regard themselves as the bearers of 
intellectual gifts from the past.  In recent years, however, many 
conservatives have distanced themselves from the higher law, at least as 
something with which the exercisers of judicial power should concern 
themselves.  Fearful that direct judicial access to natural law will operate 
as a license for “activism” at the price of democratically enacted statutes 
and the plain meaning of the Constitution, conservatives have sought to 
deny judges much or any opportunity directly to speak the natural law.1  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Walter Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982 
SUP. CT. REV. 44, 77 (1983). See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). 
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Wary about allowing entry to centuries of theorizing about the contents of 
higher law when it will matter most, at the moment of judgment, 
conservatives have remitted the natural law task to legislatures.  An 
optimistic frame of mind, one might think.     
But not entirely: conservatives have been able to count on others to 
do the heavy—or is it light?—lifting.  Over the last half-century or so, 
liberals have been the eager advocates of a higher law approach to 
judging—at least up until an historical point, to which we shall return.  
Though they have shied away from the language of “higher law” or 
“natural law,”2 liberals are the ones who have time and again convinced 
the Supreme Court (and the lower courts) to look beyond the text of the 
Constitution to recognize “rights” (that are conferred by higher law).  The 
right of privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, despite Justice 
Douglas’s unconvincing attempt to find it “in penumbras, formed by 
emanations”3 of the Constitution’s written terms, would be a leading 
example of higher law’s making its way into positive law through the 
judicial office.  “We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of 
Rights . . . , ”4 wrote Justice Douglas in Griswold.  Seven years later, in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, Justice Brennan explained for the Court that the right 
of privacy that Justice Douglas thought “inhered in the marital 
relationship” was in fact, upon further reflection, “the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.”5  And with this, the stage was set for 
Roe v. Wade a year later.  Paradoxical as it may seem to some, in recent 
American history liberals have been the greater heirs to the higher law 
tradition, and they have not allowed the inheritance to languish in the idle 
hands of pork-barrel politicians.6 
                                                 
2 “Invocation of natural law seems to have passed out of fashion among leaders of 
the movement for the extension of human right.  One might have expected the opposite.”  
R.H. Helmholz, Natural Law and Human Rights in English Law: From Bracton to 
Blackstone, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1 (2005). 
3 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
4 Id. at 486. 
5   Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
6 See Russell Hittinger, Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition, 25 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429, 496 (1990).  Hittinger’s article, which was written in 1990, 
was virtually prescient with respect to where the Supreme Court was taking the right to 
privacy. His article has had a substantial influence on my thinking about many of the 
issues that are discussed in this Article.  In addition, CHARLES HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF 
NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS: A STUDY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OF THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LIMITS ON LEGISLATURES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN PHASES OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1958), though 
no longer up to date, had a pervasive influence on my thinking about the role of natural 
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And there is, I believe, much to be admired in liberals’ stewardship 
of the higher law tradition and some of the fruits to which it has given 
birth.  To stick with the example at hand, a constitutional regime that did 
not recognize a married couple’s right to privacy in the marital bedroom 
would be, in my judgment, gravely deficient.  But what then of the charge 
that said right was recognized through an exercise of judicial “activism”?  
The answer, I think, is nicely encapsulated in what Justice Harlan said, 
concurring in the judgment in Griswold:  
[J]udicial self-restraint will not . . .  be brought about in the 
‘due process’ area [except] by continual insistence upon 
respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the 
basic values that underlie our society, and wise 
appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of 
federalism and separation of powers have played in 
establishing and preserving American freedoms.7   
We can suppose that “values” was how people—even very 
tradition-minded people—talked about higher law in the 1960s, and the 
point is that Justice Harlan appreciated that, in our judicial system, judges 
have almost always understood themselves as having some, certainly 
limited, opportunity directly to speak the natural law.  It has been a 
question of degree, not kind.8  It could have been otherwise, but that is 
how it has been.  “Activism,” it turns out, is on the side of creating a 
fiction according to which judges in our system cannot sometimes directly 
speak the natural law; the activists are those who cover over an attested 
and widely accepted, if controverted, practice.    
The tradition’s openness to natural law at the point of judicial 
decision has never been, until the other day, a channel for arbitrariness.  In 
ways that will be elaborated below, it was characteristic of the long 
tradition of theorizing about values—nee natural law and natural rights—
to recognize that every decision about what someone has a concrete 
“right” to entails the careful resolution of trade-offs; one person’s right is 
another person’s duty; claims to speak must be balanced against claims to 
be let alone; and so forth.  It was further understood that knowledge of 
natural law and natural rights, the knowledge about how to do the 
                                                                                                                         
law in our legal tradition.  Haines’s book remains indispensable on the place of natural 
law in English and American law over the period it covers.  
7 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan J., concurring).  The alternative means of 
judicial “self-restraint” under consideration was the historically unattested test proposed 
by Justices Black and Stewart, to wit, full “incorporation.” 
8 The evidence is overwhelming.  See HAINES, supra note 6, passim.  One must 
note, however, that reliance on or reference to natural law and natural rights does not 
entail a judicial power to invalidate or replace legislative enactments.   See MORTON J. 
HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960 156–59 (1992).  The 
question is much more nuanced and historically contingent.  See infra at Section IX.   
  THE PLACE OF “HIGHER LAW” 5 
 
balancing and delimiting, is itself drawn from plural sources that mutually 
reinforce and limit one another.9   
Recently, however, at the level of American constitutional 
decision-making (with derivative consequences for the functioning of the 
rest of our legal system), the long tradition of careful adjudication of 
higher law principles came to a screeching halt; that “historical point,” 
mentioned above, was reached; the commitment to nuanced 
discriminations accumulated over centuries has been largely repudiated.  
As it turns out, conservatives were right to worry, though perhaps for the 
wrong reasons.  The age-old tradition of incremental articulation by the 
judiciary of a host of natural rights that are to be balanced and 
harmonized, so as to be protected in law, has been supplanted by the 
reduction to one right.   
It happened almost at a stroke.  Though it has yet to work its way 
completely into the fabric of American law, the landmark judicial 
assertion, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, of a right “to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life”10 necessarily represents an end to the effort to discover, in 
order to give legal effect to, rights that belong to humans in virtue of the 
natural law.  We need not wait for the Court to tell us that, in a world of 
self-definition, there is no point in trying to discover other inherent rights 
and the concrete conditions in which they can be realized.  Taken for all it 
is worth, a right to self-definition is limited only by human resources for 
self-destruction.  The Court asserted in Casey that “[o]ur obligation is to 
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our moral code,”11 but a moment’s 
reflection will confirm that this amounts to the sheerest sophistry.  The 
dilemma the Court sets up is false.  In truth, to say what liberties people or 
groups will have—or will not have—just is to make moral judgments.         
I shall return to this all-important point below.  My present concern 
is the practical one that a stand-alone right to self-definition suffers from 
the fatal flaw that it defies legal implementation, in ways that I shall 
elaborate.  The unadministrability of this juridically generated doctrine is, 
I would submit, a sufficient reason to oppose it.  To this extent, then, I 
would join the conservative pushback against the self-defeating 
jurisprudence of self-definition.  However, one thinks of the baby in the 
bath water.  The widespread, reactionary rejection by conservatives of a 
place for (genuine) higher law in judging should be resisted.  As I shall 
argue, a working legal system that is not porous, at the point of judicial 
decision, to considerations of natural law and natural rights is morally 
                                                 
9 For one example, see Hittinger, supra note 6, at 498 (discussing Justice 
Frankfurter’s approach to natural law reasoning). 
10 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992). 
11 Id. at 850. 
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untenable, at least in the medium run.  Exactly how porous it must be, is a 
question of prudence, not of a Platonic Form.  
My thesis, then, is that, pace both liberals and conservatives, what 
is needful today is a recovery of the higher law tradition that liberals 
nourished until recently and that conservatives, long its champion, have 
been anathematizing in their contrapuntal campaign against “activism”12 
and the announced right to self-definition.   
“Despite the fact that the Constitution does not explicitly 
mention either natural law or natural rights, there can be no 
doubt that Americans expect the law to recognize and 
uphold natural rights.  The interpretation and reform of law 
according to natural principles of justice represents a 
recurrent pattern in the history of American legal 
culture.”13   
In order to re-develop today a working sense of the proper place of higher 
law in the quotidian practice of law, it is necessary to start by grasping the 
ways in which natural law, along with the natural rights that derive from 
it, should drive not only constitutional law, where it is perhaps most 
conspicuous, but all that we do as we go about trying, through a working 
legal system, to secure what is good for humans and to avoid what is bad 
for them.   
Caricature must be avoided.  “Natural law is a multifarious concept 
that defies simple analysis,”14 but on any reasonable analysis of it, natural 
law is not an “and now for something totally different” affair.  Nor is it 
accessible by turning the mind’s eye in the direction of a cosmic codex, “a 
sort of ghostly Internal Revenue Code in all of its magnificent detail 
written in the heavens.”15  Natural law and the natural rights that derive 
from it, I shall argue, are all about what is concretely good for humans and 
their communities, and goods are discovered through trial and error 
conducted and measured by practical reason.  A legal regime that places 
humans where they belong and delivers what is good for them, will do so 
by giving effect to the natural law and the natural rights that derive from 
it.     
                                                 
12 In their comparative study of English and American law, P.S. Atiyah and  Robert 
S. Summers have called attention to the origins and persistence of Americans’ 
expectation that law have content-oriented criteria of validity (not just source- or 
pedigree-based criteria), including natural law and natural rights.  FORM AND SUBSTANCE 
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL 
THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 3, 238 (1987).  See also HAINES, supra note 6, at 
309–52.   
13 Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 438. 
14 Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 429. 
15 STEVEN SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 47 (2004). 
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Part I introduces the topic of higher law and the judicial role by 
summarizing aspects of a recent, much-discussed encounter between 
Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Steven Smith.  Part II begins my 
argument in favor of (delimited) judicial access to higher law by pointing 
out some ways in which the legal positivist’s account fails at the level of 
description. Part III goes on to describe the non-positivist approach to 
judging that made the “common law” what it was (and could be again?): 
fined and refined reason.  Part IV zeroes in on how the common law 
expectation of reasonableness resiliently reappears in an age of statutes 
and administrative law, pace Justice Scalia.  Parts V and VI sketch an 
account of why, pace Smith and many others, a commitment to “reason” is 
not necessarily a sell-out or an evasion; properly conceived, a commitment 
to human practical reason turns out to be a commitment to truly legal 
governance.  Parts VII, VIII, and IX move from the terrain of common law 
and administrative law into the realm of constitutional law and 
fundamental rights in order to ask what a commitment to practical reason, 
natural law, and natural rights will look like at this “higher” level.  The 
Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas provides the focus for asking 
how fundamental rights fare, as a matter of law, when what the law 
guarantees is a right to self-definition.  In the Conclusion, I round out the 
discussion of judicial access to natural law and natural rights; the focus is 
on the sources of the parameters of judicial access to higher law.  The 
potential jurisprudential significance of sex toys, the one element in my 
title that will seem not like the others, crops up throughout the Article.     
Caveat lector.  As will be unmistakable by now, this paper 
represents one contribution to a larger project of attempting to revive a 
perspective in jurisprudence that is associated with the Christian tradition.  
The effort will seem to many misplaced, for, as philosopher and social 
theorist Charles Taylor has recently shown in splendid detail, we live in an 
age when an exclusive humanism is the presumptive position, and those 
who would pursue a different course have to swim against the tide all the 
way.16  The presumption today is that law can function as an exclusively 
humanistic enterprise; indeed, there is a concerted effort to demonstrate as 
much and seal up the conversation in one direction.17  But with increasing 
frequency, one encounters efforts to make the necessary 
                                                 
16  CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 19–21, 26–28, 98–99, 242–69 (2007). 
17 See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE  (2007).  Brian 
Tamanaha, another influential voice in the current conversation, though not (to my 
knowledge) committed to a Christian perspective in law, is concerned not to let law be 
hijacked by ideological forces,  and is willing to acknowledge that “belief” may be 
necessary. See BRIAN Z. TAMANANHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (2006). On the latter 
point, see Marc O. DeGirolami, Faith in the Rule of Law, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 573, 
600–05 (2008).  Another aspect of Tamanaha’s work is discussed infra text at notes 169 
and 170.  
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counterargument.18  The effort to recover a natural law perspective in a 
post-Christian world is the work of Christians and others who will insist 
that theirs are voices at the collective table as well;19 natural law and 
natural rights are not now, nor have they ever been, the monopoly of 
Christians.   Steven Smith (whose work will figure prominently in this 
Article) may well be right that it is utterly unlikely “that any full-bodied 
version of natural law will flourish in the contemporary American 
jurisprudential environment soon,”20 but, given the resilience of natural 
law discourse over time, the argument on behalf of the natural law does 
not amount to whistling in the dark.  Natural law and natural rights may be 
down, but in the course of American legal history, they’ve never been all 
the way out – so much so that it is legal positivism’s comparative success 
that needs explaining.21   In the marketplace of ideas, the traditional 
position remains a voice to be heard.  And that position is that it is not so 
much that human positive law needs to be made moral (though it surely 
does), but that positive law is not authoritative if it does not proceed from 
an order of law that precedes human invention.       
I.   A QUANDARY IN LAW?  
A recent—and really quite remarkable—encounter between Justice 
Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court and Steven Smith will 
serve to introduce the questions I wish to explore.  That encounter takes 
the form of a review by Justice Scalia of Professor Smith’s much-
discussed book Law’s Quandary, published in 2004.22  Accordingly, I 
begin with a brief statement of Smith’s thesis (which I shall elaborate 
later) and then turn to what Justice Scalia had to say about it.  In short 
order, something spectacular from the vantage point of contemporary 
jurisprudence will be on display. 
                                                 
18 The recently-deceased dean of American “law and religion” studies, Harold 
Berman, recounts that when, roughly two generations ago, he first began to work in the 
area of law and religion (his earlier work was on Russian law), his colleagues at Harvard 
Law simply ignored that part of his work.  See his foreword to MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL 
ET AL., CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (2001). 
19 The Jewish case for natural law is made by Rabbi David Novak in NATURAL LAW 
IN JUDAISM (1998). 
20 Steven D. Smith, De-Moralized: Glucksberg in the Malaise, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1571, 1591 (2008). 
21 See ATIYAH and SUMMERS, supra note 12, at 239. 
22 Symposium volumes dedicated to consideration of Law’s Quandary were 
published by two law reviews.  The SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW volume 44 (2007) included 
contributions by Steven Smith, Joseph Vining, Brian Bix, Patrick McKinley Brennan, 
and Lawrence Solum.  The CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW volume 55 (2006) 
included contributions by Steven Smith, William Wagner, Justice Antonin Scalia, Joseph 
Vining, Lloyd Weinreb, and Patrick McKinley Brennan. 
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It is Smith’s contention that much of what those engaged in the 
practice of law say and do requires, on pain of incoherence, that there be 
more than many people would be willing to affirm as a matter of common 
sense.  Everybody has a working sense of what exists; everybody has, as 
Smith puts it, an everyday ontological inventory.23  Mountains are on 
everybody’s everyday ontological inventory; unicorns are on (almost) 
nobody’s.  Smith’s iconoclastic observation is that the ontology implicated 
by ordinary statements of law exceeds most people’s workaday inventory.  
In other words, what law’s practitioners say or imply is “real” in law does 
not appear on the list of things most people regard, explicitly or implicitly, 
as solidly part of the furniture of the universe.  Ominously, it may require 
more.   
To pick one of Smith’s examples, many or perhaps most judges—
and the smart lawyers arguing before them—continue to act as if 
statements of law are evidence of the law, not the law itself.  It is Smith’s 
observation that practitioners of law still presuppose the existence of what 
used to be called “higher law,” of which statements of law are so many 
pieces of evidence.  Roughly a century after Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., infamously dismissed the “brooding omnipresence in the 
sky,”24 thinking that he was doing as much for posterity, it appears that 
practitioners of law are still saying about legal materials that they do not 
as such constitute the law.  To take a noteworthy instance that is roughly 
contemporaneous with Smith’s book, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme 
Court of the United States used its power of judicial review to strike down 
a statute that criminalized consensual homosexual sodomy, and in doing 
so, the Court stated that its decision just seventeen years earlier in Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 25 which had refused to strike down a similar statute, was 
“not correct when it was decided.”26      
But by what standard, we are led to ask, was Bowers adjudged “not 
correct?”  It is concessum that the text of the U.S. Constitution says 
nothing, in terms, about a right to engage in such conduct.27  Is it the case, 
then, that Bowers was adjudged “not correct”—not just, say, unpopular or 
unseemly—by a non-legal standard?   Surely it would be, at best, a-
nomalous (in the etymological sense of the word) for laws to be adjudged 
unlawful on non-legal grounds.28  But if, then, Bowers was wrong as a 
                                                 
23 SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY, supra note 15, at 8–11. 
24 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
25 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
26 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
27 I say “such conduct” because, for reasons that appear below, it is not at all clear 
exactly what right Lawrence recognizes.  See infra note 118. 
28 This is the common (though not the only possible) view.  See, e.g., “It follows – 
since a legal decision can only be wrong if it is contrary to law – that the law must be 
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matter of law, what is—what is the ontological status of—the law that 
precedes both the Constitution and what the courts authoritatively say and 
decide?  Is it what much of the Western tradition, descending from both 
Athens and Jerusalem, has referred to as the “natural law”?  Is it of divine 
provenance? If it is not, then how did it get to be higher?  And so forth.       
It is no part of Smith’s project in Law’s Quandary to give such 
questions definitive answers.  Clever lawyer that he is, Smith is content to 
rest his case with the observation that, if he is right about the recurrent 
evidence that the way we persist in practicing law—notwithstanding 
Justice Holmes and his so-called Legal Realist successors—presupposes 
the existence of a higher law, we are stuck living in the “quandary” that 
gives his book its title.29  The alleged quandary is that while the regnant 
jurisprudence goes on denying the existence (and a fortiori the relevance) 
of any higher law, practitioners of law—judges, lawyers, and citizens—go 
on acting as if there exists a law that precedes the statements of law that 
abound, such that, for example, Bowers could be “not correct” as a matter 
of higher law, not just of opinion, taste, or judicial self-assertion.   
Justice Scalia, for his part, is not convinced that Smith has met the 
burden of proof, and in reply the Justice argues in the alternative.  First, 
Justice Scalia combs Smith’s plentiful evidence and finds in it less of a 
commitment to “higher law” than Smith finds there.30  Second, Justice 
Scalia argues that if one is practicing law the way one ought to practice 
law, there is no risk of a quandary.31  The way we ought to practice law, 
according to Justice Scalia, is as textualists.  Textualism, of course, is the 
judicial philosophy that Justice Scalia has famously championed for a 
generation now, the strictures of which are that judges are called upon 
simply to give legal texts the meaning that they would have had to an 
ordinary person at the time of their enactment.32  What textualism requires 
appears on every sensible person’s everyday ontological inventory; 
nothing more exotic than texts and ordinary meanings are required; no 
quandary looms. 
Third, not willing to leave things there, Scalia goes on good-
naturedly to chide Smith for not coming right out and saying that God is 
                                                                                                                         
something higher than any decision.”  SIR JOHN BAKER, THE LAW’S TWO BODIES 5 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2001).  See also BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL 
SCIENCE 29–30 (Columbia Univ. Press 1928). 
29 SMITH, QUANDARY, supra note 15, at 176–79. 
30 Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven D. Smith’s Law’s Quandary, 55 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 687, 688–90 (2006). 
31  Id. at 689–90. 
32 For the now-classic statement of his position, see ANTONIN SCALIA, “Common-
Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in 
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,” in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3–48 (1997).  
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necessary if the practice of law is (as Smith suggests that most of us 
believe) not simply a matter of giving legal texts their ordinary meanings.  
Here is how Justice Scalia’s review of Law’s Quandary ends: 
As one reaches the end of the book, after reading [Professor 
Joseph] Vining’s just-short-of-theological imaginings 
followed by Smith’s acknowledgment of “richer realities 
and greater powers in the universe,” he . . . is sorely 
tempted to leap up and cry out, “Say it, man! Say it!  Say 
the G-word! G-G-G-G-God!”  Surely even academics can 
accept, as a hypothetical author, a hypothetical God!  
Textualists, being content with a “modest” judicial role, do 
not have to call in the almighty to eliminate their 
philosophical confusion.  But Smith may be right that a 
more ambitious judicial approach demands what might be 
called a deus ex hypothesi.33 
Justice Scalia’s positive thesis can be summarized as follows.  On 
the one hand, a “modest” judicial role is satisfied by the rudiments of 
textualism, nothing more extravagant being required on the ontological 
inventory.  On the other hand, a more ambitious judicial role would 
require the involvement of God.  Perhaps the Almighty’s role would be as 
the promulgator of a “higher law”—something not on the everyday 
ontological inventory? 
There will be more to say about the details of the Smith-Scalia 
disagreement, but first the elephant in the room, the spectacle I alluded to 
at the outset of this Section.  Mainstream jurisprudence, from Holmes to 
his contemporary off-the-rack imitators, largely ignores the possibility that 
something or someone “higher” plays some part in what we do in law, and 
when it does not ignore the higher possibility, it usually does so in order to 
dismiss or even ridicule it.  Steven Smith, however, has thrown the higher 
possibility into bold relief.  The Smith-Scalia exchange has done 
contemporary jurisprudence the favor of returning important questions 
closer to academic respectability.  Many will mock both them and their 
pursuers, but the elephant remains resolutely in the room.   
Smith, though, having placed the elephant, leaves things there, 
suggesting that while our current “[p]erplexity is not a resting place,”34 we 
can at the moment do no more than “to confess our confusion and to 
acknowledge that there are richer realities and greater powers in the 
universe than our meager modern philosophies have dreamed of.”35  As 
Smith sees things, we are stuck in the aforementioned quandary.   
                                                 
33 Scalia, Review, supra note 30, at 694. 
34 SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY, supra note 15, at 179. 
35 Id. 
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But are we?  As mentioned, Justice Scalia responds by suggesting 
that a legal system equipped with an abstemious judicial role can get by 
without God or anything more than texts, but he also goes further coyly to 
speculate that Smith’s own reticence just might be programmatic:   
Hmmm.  Richer realities and greater powers than our 
modern philosophies have dreamed of.  Could there be a 
subversive subtext here? . . .  Could it be . . .  that Smith is 
inviting, tempting, seducing his fellow academics to 
consider the theological way out of the quandary – the way 
that seemed to work for the classical school?36  
By the time the Smith-Scalia tete-a-tete is over, academic protocol has 
been violated (by the mere mention of God), but neither Smith nor Scalia 
has made the philosophico-theological case that practicing law does entail 
something that involves God or higher law.  In fact, Scalia-the-textualist 
even denies it – though perhaps, as with Smith, for programmatic reasons.   
II.  POSITIVE LAW, EVIDENCE OF BELIEF, AND NATURAL LAW 
In puzzling out the relationship between higher law and the 
quotidian practice of law, we can start by noticing the single most 
important statement in analytic jurisprudence about what the law is.  The 
statement is by John Austin, and its importance is a function of its 
combined influence and falsity.  According to Austin, law is the command 
of the sovereign backed by the threat of punishment.37  Period.  This is one 
manifestation of the jurisprudential stance known as positivism, the view 
that what is the law is such solely in virtue of its pedigree, viz., that it has 
been posited – put in place – by the sovereign of a state.  Justice Louis 
Brandeis continued in this vein when, in the landmark case Erie v. 
Tomkins, he quoted Justice Holmes as follows: “law in the sense in which 
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority 
behind it . . . . The authority and only authority is the State . . .”38  The 
negative pregnant of the Holmes-Brandeis thesis is that only what the state 
declares to be law is law, and it is law regardless of its content.  One 
commentator captured the thesis as follows:  “there can be no legal right 
which is not recognized or created by the sovereign power of the state.”39   
                                                 
36 Scalia, Review, supra note 30, at 693–694. 
37 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 18–38 (Wilfrid 
Rumble, ed., 1995). 
38  Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Kyhn v. Fairmont Coal, 
215 U.S. 349 (1910)). 
39 C.G. TEIDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 71 
(1890), discussed by Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 437.  Teideman summarizes 
the point only to criticize its accuracy as a description of American legal practice. 
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But this line of theorizing takes things too easily, I think—more 
easily than the practioners of law actually take things.  Even Holmes 
observed that Austin knew too little English law.40  Our legal practice 
defies the simplification according to which law is exactly a sovereign’s 
commands.  What gives us law that can be obeyed is not identical with the 
sovereign decrees and the Austinian positivist sees.  There is more to the 
springs of law than sovereign commands.  What we do in law “takes place 
in a field of pain and death”41 (as the famous phrase of the late Robert 
Cover has it), and, with exceptions that prove the rule, we strive to get it as 
right as we are able because of what it, including (but not exclusively) its 
force, means to us and to our common and individual possibilities.  In a 
word, the estimable achievement that is our legal system owes its 
greatness to a history of craftsmen committed to criticizing, according to 
some standard that is not an evanescent artifact of our creation, what has 
been laid down, in order to improve it.  What gives us law is a process that 
itself is governed by a higher law, even if we do not call it that —
although, as I shall explain, I think there are important reasons both to call 
it that and to have reason to mean it.     
The simplifiers and excluders, the soft positivists and the hard 
positivists are all of them voices in the conversation, to be sure, and they 
have their points.  Law to live by does need to be stable so as to be 
knowable and reliable.42  However, the simplifiers and excluders arrive on 
the scene when what we do in law is already more layered than they would 
allow.  In the words of Professor Joseph Vining, whose work Smith 
explores: “[L]aw is evidence of belief far stronger than academic 
statement and introspection can provide.”43  And that evidence is that, 
whatever the normative point of the legal positivist, to which we shall 
return, the practitioners of law, with exceptions that prove the rule, find 
ways of making the law what it should be.  As Vining says, “[l]egislation 
is the arbitrary that we allow – but also limit.  To make the point in its 
strongest form, it could be said that legislation is lawless behavior, except 
that by a paradoxical trick we make legislative statutes materials we use in 
                                                 
40  Oliver Wendel Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 1006 
(1897) (“The trouble with Austin was that he did not know enough English law”).  
41  Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
42 This is not to say, and I neither suggest nor argue, that law’s content is or should 
be uncontroversial.  Indeed, I do not regard “agreement” as a necessary condition of 
law’s legitimacy.  See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Equality, Conscience, and the Liberty 
of the Church: Justifying the Controversiale per Controversialius, VILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009) (symposium on the work of Martha Nussbaum).  See also Hittinger, 
Liberalism, supra note 6, at 432–35, on the appearance of the expectation that law be 
agreeable to all. 
43 JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP 5 (1996). 
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determining what the law is.”44  Although destined to be imperfect in its 
results, the quest to bring a higher law to bear in the ordinary practice of 
law is conspicuous for its intransigence.  
In articulating the relationship between higher law and the law we 
create, it is easy to get too high too fast.  It is even a fair question whether 
“higher law,” the term I have favored so far (because of its currency owing 
to its place in the title of the famous study by Edward Corwin), is 
inevitably too misleading to be serviceable.  “Higher” may connote 
inaccessibility or, even more extreme, otherness.  Corwin himself 
considered the higher law position “quaint.”45  The near-ubiquity of 
Holmes’s “brooding omnipresence” caricature makes it nearly impossible 
to recall that most of the traditional partisans of “higher law” had in mind 
nothing of the sort Holmes dismissed.46   
A similar sinkhole of confusion lurks near this kindred term 
“natural law.”  For example, “law of nature” was historically often used as 
a synonym for natural law. To the modern ear, however, laws of nature 
denote the deliverances of Newtonian physics, not an ordinance of reason 
that humans can freely follow or flout.47  Likewise, the expression “natural 
law” is sometimes understood to denote the theory according to which 
nature herself “legislates” for us.  But in that case, then, natural law would 
be lower rather than higher, a mere biologism.  And there is the related 
fact, further, that even among those theorists whose natural law bona fides 
cannot be questioned, from Thomas Aquinas in thirteenth century to John 
Finnis in the twenty-first, there is considerable disagreement about how to 
define the natural law.  For Aquinas, it is truly law; for Finnis, it is law 
only in an analogous sense.48 
For reasons to which I shall come in due course, I regard the issue 
of definition as exceedingly important, but I also believe that one can go a 
very long way without getting it altogether settled.  In a jurisprudential 
world in which the legal positivist dominates, almost—though not quite—
all non-positivist positions can usefully be grouped under a “natural law” 
umbrella.  What those under the umbrella have in common is the judgment 
                                                 
44 Id. at 253. 
45 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 (1955). 
46 Holmes, it is worth recalling, had been reading German idealists, not the theorists 
of the natural law who were themselves innocent of Geist. Hittinger, Liberalism, supra 
note 6, at 469 n.192. 
47  On the shift from natural law to the laws of nature, see Jane E. Ruby, The Origins 
of Scientific ‘Law”, 47 J. OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 341–59 (1986). 
48  On this issue in Aquinas, far and away the best source is Stephen L. Brock, The 
Legal Character of Natural Law According to St. Thomas Aquinas (1988) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto).  For Finnis’s position, see JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 276–81, 294 (1981). 
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that posited legal materials do not exhaust the legal universe; in other 
words, what we have produced, and what we do, in law remain permeable 
to objective moral evaluation.  For example, the statute that is palpably 
unjust may or must in certain circumstances be denied effect; likewise, the 
rights articulated in a written constitution do not necessarily exhaust 
people’s fundamental rights in law, such that it is at least possible that 
Bowers was “not correct” when it was decided.   
But what cannot be grouped under the capacious natural law 
umbrella are all those moral theories that boil down to variations on the 
theme of self-projection or emotivism.  The natural law tradition has as a 
core plank that there exists a moral order not of our own creation, and 
those who regard morality as something to be created ex nihilo, either 
individually or collectively, necessarily cannot abide that claim.  
Therefore, postponing the question of the correct definition of natural law 
for the moment, I would suggest the following working definition or 
placeholder:  “Natural law is an order that: (1) reason does not make, in 
the sense that it is not an artifact of our practical agenda; (2) is 
presupposed by legal and moral deliberation, and is brought to light by 
theory and reflection; and (3) is in some way normative for conduct and 
for our legal artifacts.”49   
III.  TRADITION AND REASON IN THE LAW 
What, then, has been the relationship between natural law thus 
understood and the practice of law?  First the canard, because it has had 
wide purchase.  Sir William Blackstone famously taught that the law of 
England was the custom of the realm from time immemorial, and 
adjudication was a process of oracular law-finding and declaration.50  
Blackstone’s image of the judge as a ventriloquist has enjoyed lots of play, 
and was especially appealing to those late-nineteenth century common law 
judges who wanted little credit for innovating at a rate that would keep up 
with the breakneck speed of the Industrial Revolution and its collateral 
social consequences.51     
Blackstone’s portrayal of the judicial role, however, was 
inadequate, first, to what English judges actually did and, second, to how 
they understood what they were doing.   The genius of the common law 
was not that Englishmen in time immemorial already had everything all 
figured out, such that all of us who came later could live by their perfect 
                                                 
49 Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 429. 
50 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69 (1765–69). 
51 Blackstone’s Commentaries went through dozens of editions, and in the United 
States became the single most used source by judges and lawyers in search of the 
doctrines of the common law (in an environment short on case reporters). On the Janus-
faced character of Blackstone’s legal and political theory, see Duncan Kennedy, 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 247 (1979). 
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rules set out in an exhaustive set of precedents.  Writing more than a 
century before Blackstone, Lord Coke said it best:  “Reason is the life of 
the law; nay, the common law itselfe is nothing else but reason.”52    
Crucially, what Coke meant by reason, as he proceeded to explain, was 
not the achievement of a single individual, but the temporally extended 
achievement of a group: the “artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long 
study, observation and experience, . . . fined and refined over centuries by 
generations of grave and learned men. . . .”53  Not just because of 
Blackstone, but in all kinds of ways, through all manner of fictions, and in 
varying degrees, judges in the common law tradition have masked 
themselves and covered over their creativity.   
Though they seem rarely and perhaps admirably to have called 
attention to the fact, the judges of England were part of a practice of 
creative but bounded innovation.54  The process has been analogized to 
playing a game of Scrabble.55  There are some things you can do and some 
you cannot, the options change as things go forward, and there is a 
premium on cleverness.  Whereas Blackstone had judges ventriloquizing 
for a mythical past, the common law judge as understood by Coke is a 
contributor to a dynamic tradition, what philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre 
has described as a “historically extended, and socially embodied”56 
process which sets the conditions for its own continuous growth and 
development.   
Tradition here is not the process of recapitulating the past, but 
rather, as Mary Ann Glendon has explained, the crucible of creativity in 
which the current generation can add a layer of intelligence to what has 
been handed down, thus meeting the challenge of a world that has never 
before existed.57  As Justice Scalia acknowledges, siding with Coke 
against Blackstone,  
                                                 
52  THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *97b (1628). 
53 Id.. For a compendious but example-rich statement of the method of common law 
judges, See SIR JOHN BAKER, THE LAW’S TWO BODIES, supra note 28, at 1–32, 59–186. 
54 “One need not seek far in English case law to find impressive examples of the use 
of the doctrine of reason or reasonableness, though the law of nature connotations of 
these phrases may be inadvertently or purposely concealed.”  HAINES, REVIVAL, supra 
note 6, at 41.  See also Helmholz, Natural Law, supra note 2. 
55   Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 32, at 8. 
56 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 206 (3rd ed. 2007).  See also Patrick 
McKinley Brennan, “What’s the Matter with You Catholics?”  Soundings in Catholic 
Social Thought: A Review of “Traditions in Turmoil” by Mary Ann Glendon, II J.L., 
PHIL. & CULTURE 291, 293–94 (2008). 
57 Mary Ann Glendon, Knowledge Makes a Noisy Entrance: The Struggle for Self-
Appropriation in Law, in Fred Lawrence, ed., 10 LONERGAN WORKSHOP J. 119, 123–35 
(1994). 
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from an early time – as early as the Year Books, which 
record English judicial decisions from the end of the 
thirteenth century to the beginning of sixteenth – any 
equivalence between custom and common law had ceased 
to exist . . .  The issues coming before the courts involved, 
more and more, refined questions to which customary 
practice provided no answer. . . .  58   
Over and over one finds the students of the common law 
commending it for being a great system of reason.59  Indeed, as legal 
historian A.W. Brian Simpson has explained, “[i]n the common law 
system no very clear distinction exists between saying that a particular 
solution to a problem is in accordance with the law, and saying that it is 
the rational, or fair, or just solution.”60  J.N. Figgis puts the point 
succinctly:  “Common Law is the perfect ideal law; for it is natural reason 
developed and expounded by the collective wisdom of many 
generations.”61  Likewise Charles Fried:  “When we say of a judge or 
lawyer that he is learned in the law, we assume that there is a body of 
knowledge to be learned in, and that such learning increases wisdom, 
judgment, and justice.”62   
In the long history of the common law, there have been periods of 
greater and lesser fertility, creativity, and success in developing natural 
reason so as to achieve the fair, just, or right solutions.  The American 
legal theorist Karl Llewellyn described the peculiar greatness of 
America’s early common law judges in these terms: 
The tone and mark consist in an as-of-courseness in the 
constant questing for better and best law to guide the 
future, but the better and best law is to be built on and out 
of what the past can offer; the quest consists in a constant 
reexamination and reworking of a heritage, that the heritage 
may yield not only solidity but comfort for the new day and 
for the morrow. 
It is a way of on-going renovation of doctrine, but touch 
with the past is too close, the mood is too craft-conscious, 
                                                 
58 SCALIA, Common-Law Courts, supra note 32, at 4. 
59 See HAINES, REVIVAL, supra note 6, at 39–43. 
60 The Common Law and Legal Theory, in A.W.B. SIMPSON, OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE, SECOND SERIES 77, 79 (1973). 
61 J. N. FIGGIS, DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 229 (1896). 
62  Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. 
L. REV. 35, 58 (1981). 
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the need for the clean line is too great, for the renovation to 
smell of revolution or, indeed, of campaigning reform. 63     
And it was precisely these qualities that led Justice Scalia himself 
to concede that the common law method “has proven to be a good method 
of developing the law in many fields – and perhaps the very best 
method.”64 
IV.  LEGAL LESSONS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
This high praise from Justice Scalia, though, came as a concession 
in the context of a sustained argument against the continued use of that 
very method today in the U.S.  Justice Scalia’s stated objection to the 
common law method stems from several related sources, which come 
down to this: democracy.  All that the common law judges achieved 
“would be an unqualified good,” says Justice Scalia, “were it not for a 
trend in government that has developed in recent centuries, called 
democracy.”65  Justice Scalia continues:  “[T]he Mr. Fix-it mentality of the 
common-law judge”66 is inconsistent with the demands of democracy.   
But surely this is not necessarily the case.  It is perfectly competent 
to the people, is it not, for them to decide that they wish to have judges 
adding, as I have said, a layer of intelligence to what has been handed 
down?  If this is what the demos wants, then why should “democracy” 
stand in the way of it?  I understand that sometimes judges do otherwise 
than what they have been charged to do, but that would be a separate 
problem – not an argument from democracy simpliciter. 
Whatever the verdict on this question, however, it is overshadowed 
by the undeniable fact that by now, the people, through their elected 
representatives, have enacted vast bodies of statute law, rafts of positive 
law that were unknown in the period in which the common law judge was 
at his stride.  These enactments supplant the wide fields of legal territory 
once cultivated by the common law judges in their creative but careful 
way.  We live in an age of statute law.   
But even statutes are not self-interpreting.  The question then 
arises: What are judges to do not with precedents but with statutes?  Guido 
Calabresi famously suggested that we need a common law for the age of 
statutes, a common law approach to statute law.67  Other suggestions have 
                                                 
63 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 36 (1960) (discussed by 
Glendon, Knowledge Makes a Noisy Entrance, supra note 57, at 130). 
64 SCALIA, Common-Law Courts, supra note 32, at 12. 
65 Id. at 9. 
66 Id. at 14. 
67 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
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included “dynamic statutory interpretation.”68  Justice Scalia’s response to 
these and cognate suggestions, of course, is textualism.  With the possible 
exception of scrivener’s errors, the textualist judge just goes ahead and 
implements the legislature’s will as expressed in the statute as understood 
by an ordinary hearer at the time of enactment (though stopping short, for 
example, of giving effect to scrivener’s errors)69—so long, of course, as it 
is “constitutional,” a judgment the nature of which we are coming to. 
So far, then, the picture is one of judges removing their common-
law wigs and donning their statutory-interpretation visors.  This picture is 
staggeringly misleading, however, because it leaves nearly everything out.  
Yes, we live in an age of statute law, but, correlatively, we also live in an 
administrative state.  Most statutes are made to be given effect by 
administrative agencies.    
Today, nearly all authoritative guides to primary conduct, which if 
necessary will be given coercive effect in court and then with the help of 
the sheriff, are of administrative origin: the rules and orders made by 
administrative agencies pursuant to statutes that create the agencies and 
give them their specific regulatory tasks to perform.  However, and this is 
the rub: although agencies do indeed create rules and decide adjudications, 
their doing so does not, as such, assure those outputs will carry the force of 
law. 70  No, administrative outputs are subject to a complex web of 
potential forms of judicial review under a wide range of statutorily 
prescribed and judicially fashioned standards.  And judicial review of 
administration, I want to suggest, is where the common law’s virtually 
inexorable insistence on “fined and refined” reasonableness reenters 
through the side door.  We can recall here Joseph Vining’s observation 
that “legislation is the arbitrary that we allow—but also limit.”71   
To take a concrete example, the statute setting forth the standards 
according to which courts review administrative action, section 706 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, provides that the “court shall . . . 
hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, 
capricious.”  There are historically interesting reasons why the statute 
sought by its terms to set the reasonableness bar so very low (“arbitrary, 
                                                 
68 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). 
69   See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) 
(confessing that he is a “faint-hearted” originalist); see also Randy Barnett, Scalia’s 
Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006). 
70   See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Giving Effect to the Natural Law: Thoughts from 
the Catholic Tradition on Delegation, the Good, and Authority, __ MICH. ST. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2009) (symposium volume) (discussing how administrative outputs attain 
“the force of law” by being the product of deliberation and fairness). 
71 VINING, supra note 43, at 253. 
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capricious”),72 but one should not be deceived by the mere words of the 
statute.  As Vining suggested, what we do in law is far more powerful 
evidence of belief than is what we say.  When confronted with “the 
argument that the arbitrary and capricious standard,” as it is called,  
mandates only that an agency exercise the minimum 
rationality required of a legislature by the due process 
clause [of the U. S. Constitution], the Court replied, “We 
do not view as equivalent the presumption of 
constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by Congress 
and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in 
fulfilling its statutory mandate.”  Rather, the Court held, an 
agency must articulate a “satisfactory” explanation for its 
actions that does not “run[] counter to the evidence before 
the agency” and that demonstrates a “rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.”73 
The case from which the commentator quotes is one of the small 
number of Supreme Court decisions that vie to define judicial review of 
administrative outputs in the U.S. today.74 
To be sure, there is no end of to’ing and fro’ing on precisely how 
demanding courts should be when reviewing agency action.  There is no 
end of effort to chop the onion ever finer, and sometimes one hears stark 
claims that courts should back off and let agencies pretty much do what 
they will.  And, to be sure, one sometimes finds courts imposing their own 
will to the exclusion of agencies’ reasoned results.  But Justice Felix 
Frankfurter caught the thrust of the expectation of the American legal 
system when he said that “[r]eviewing courts must be influenced by a 
feeling that they are not to abdicate the conventional judicial function,” 
and that in adopting a “phraseology” governing review Congress 
“express[es] a mood,”75 not something mechanical.  And what stands out 
about the mood as appropriated by the U.S. courts is, I think, the pervasive 
insistence that reason prevail, and this by “the conventional judicial 
function” of adding a layer of intelligence to what has been handed 
                                                 
72 “When we recall that the APA was essentially New Deal legislation that made 
some compromises with conservative anti-conservative anti-big government sentiment, 
we can see why ‘arbitrary and capricious” was a lunacy test.  Liberals and Democrats in 
general, and the New Deal in particular, had had a lot of trouble with the courts in the 
1920s and thirties.”  MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?:  JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 56 (1988).  
73 Merrick Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 545 
(1985). 
74 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
75 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487–490 (1951) (emphasis 
added). 
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down.76  One of the great American administrative law scholars of the last 
generation put the matter this way: 
I have suggested that normally the courts should tolerate 
agency law making which does not in the courts’ opinion 
seem clearly contrary to the statutory purposes as the courts 
understand them.  But the statute under which an agency 
operates is not the whole law applicable to its operation.  
An agency is not an island entire of itself.  It is one of the 
many rooms in the magnificent mansion of the law.  The 
very subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is 
intended to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be 
brought into harmony with the totality of the law; the law 
as it is found in the statute at hand, the statute book at large, 
the principles and conceptions of the “common law,” and 
the ultimate guarantees associated with the Constitution.77 
This is artfully said, right up to and including at the end: not the 
ultimate guarantees given by the Constitution, but those “associated” with 
it.  There are guarantees that precede and bid to control written, positive 
law in its myriad and diverse phases and forms, a point to which we shall 
return. 
I said above that when discussing the bearing of higher law on the 
practice of law, it is easy to get too high too fast.  What I have just been 
describing – bread-and-butter judicial review of routine administrative 
activity—may strike some as irrelevant to my announced topic “higher 
law.”  Both proponents and opponents of higher or natural law sometimes 
suppose that a working legal system that respects the natural law will, in a 
blaze of cosmic glory, authorize Solomonic judges to speak the natural or 
higher law directly, without benefit of any preceding positive law sources 
or restrictions.  But, with qualifications to be added in due course, quite 
the opposite is the case.  Higher law receives its due only if it works its 
way into the particulars, and it rarely reaches the particulars without a lot 
of wind-up, revisions, corrections, and recalibrations.  Workaday judicial 
review for reasonableness is one, though by no means the only, example in 
our legal system of (what I shall refer to as) higher law in its ordinary 
mode, making a slow and labored entrance.   
                                                 
76   See Joseph Vining, Authority and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of 
Deference, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 135 (1991) (discussing how responsible agency 
investment in the questions that come before it becomes the ground for courts to 
recognize the “force of law” in agency outputs). 
77 LOUIS J. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 589–90 (1965). I do not 
suggest that Professor Jaffe was deliberate about leaving the way open to “higher law” in 
the sense I intend it here, only that his formulation does leave the way open beyond 
posited statements of law.  
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V.  DIALECTIC AND PRACTICAL REASON 
Before turning to the question of higher law in (what I shall refer 
to as) its extraordinary mode of entrance, we should pause and ask why 
our legal system’s demand for reasonableness, which I have been tracing, 
should count as a manifestation of “higher law” at work.  Related to this 
question is another: who in the world is opposed to reasonableness 
anyway.  In other words, have I set up an anti-reason straw man in order to 
install a weak “higher law” that is nothing more than garden-variety 
practical reason?  To put a slightly different question: Does the inveterate 
insistence upon reasonableness meet the test set out in the deliberately 
broad-church placeholder definition I postulated at the outset? 
There are several points that need to be made.  First, the assault on 
reason in the legal academy has been nothing short of riotous.  It has taken 
legion forms (from so-called Critical Legal Studies, which sees only 
power, to legal pragmatism which recognizes only an instrumental role for 
reason), but Holmes himself had pretty much said it all before.  “You will 
find some text writers telling you that law is a system of reason,”78 wrote 
Holmes, but that, he went on to say, is sheer nonsense.  According to 
Holmes, law is (as Austin taught us) no more than the command of the 
sovereign backed by the threat that the state will bring its arm to bear; 
reasonableness is not a condition.  As for “reason” as it was traditionally 
understood, Holmes wrote: “I have no faith that reason is the last word of 
the universe.  I know nothing about it.”79  The only sort of reason Holmes 
seems willing to admit is instrumental reason (e.g., if I want x, I better do 
y to get it).  Thus, “[r]eason working on experience does tell us, no doubt, 
that if our wish to live continues, we can do it only on [certain] terms.  But 
that seems to me the whole of the matter.”80  And, for Holmes, “natural 
law” turns out to be no more than the run of mankind’s “Can’t Helps,” that 
is, those things we find our selves having to believe.81    
Holmes’s rejection of non-instrumental reason was thoroughgoing 
and, in its Nietzschean way, profound.  There is also, though, an element 
of silliness (which became more pronounced in his imitators) in the 
rejection of the place of non-instrumental reason in the life of the law, and 
it is important to spot the following point of entry.  In the famous opening 
lines of his book The Common Law, Holmes opined that “[t]he life of the 
                                                 
78 Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 40, at 994. 
79 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND 
HAROLD J. LASKI 1916–1935 1314–15 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). 
80 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 313 (1921).   
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law has not been logic: it has been experience.”82  The logic-or-experience 
dilemma, however, is false.   
On the one hand, it is true that, as the nineteenth century thundered 
along, the judges who grew increasingly self-effacing gave their opinions 
ever more of a logical form.  Holmes knew what he was talking about 
when he observed that “[t]he language of judicial decision is mainly the 
language of logic.  And,” as he went on to say, “the logical method and 
form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every 
human mind.”83  However, Holmes was not right that the alternative to 
logic is brute experience.  In the realm of human affairs, it is, rather, 
reflection (upon experience) leading to judgment, or, in the traditional 
phrase, practical reason.   
As the central tradition of moral philosophy understood until 
recently, “‘[p]ractical reason’ is reasoning . . . about what to do.”84  
Historically, it stood opposed to theoretical reasoning about what is.  
Confidence in theoretical reason operating in the modes of science has 
grown in inverse proportion to the moral philosophers’ confidence that, 
when it comes to what to do, there is anything to “reason” about, except 
perhaps instrumentally.   
In the tradition of which the common lawyers and judges were a 
part, however, it was the essential function of practical reason to be able to 
identify goods, that is, acts worth performing and states of affairs worth 
bringing into existence; e.g., learning is an act worth doing, self-mutilation 
is not; a just and reliable system of food distribution is a state of affairs 
worth bringing into existence, a system that reliably allows foods to spoil 
or be stolen is not.  Now, there is no gainsaying the varied nature of the 
philosophical disputes about how all this works or does not work at the 
level of epistemology, but this much is clear:  the traditional view was that 
there are goods, that we can know them, and what it is to know a good is 
exactly to know that it should be done or pursued.     
Furthermore, as Mary Ann Glendon has observed, “[t]he common 
law method was never,” despite what the common-law judges (caricatured 
by Holmes) typically said, 
a system of deductive and inductive logic; nor was it mere 
praxis unchastened by theory; nor was it just a system of 
reasoning by analogy with the principles of choice more or 
less up for grabs. Lawyers do, to be sure, employ all of 
those forms of reasoning, but the mode of analysis that is 
the hallmark of the Anglo-American common-law tradition 
is one that dates back to antiquity – dialectical reasoning.   
                                                 
82 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
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Glendon continues: 
Dialectical reasoning, which came into disrepute among 
philosophers starting with Descartes, begins with 
controversy – with premises that are doubtful or in dispute 
– rather than with known or irrefutable givens.  It does not 
aim at certainty, but at determining which of opposing 
opinions supported by strong arguments should be 
accepted.  That should not lead one to regard dialectical 
reasoning as a mere form of rhetoric however (unless one is 
prepared to understand rhetoric as more than the art of 
persuasion).  For dialectic at its best involves a “groping for 
truth.”  In the human sciences, we inch our way toward 
such glimpses of truth as are available to us, using the 
means of investigating facts, critical inquiry, dialogue, 
disputation, and defense of one point of view against 
another.85    
Though we merely grope our way toward knowledge of what it 
would be truly good for us to do, incrementalism is toto caelo apart from 
indifferentism or skepticism. 
The traditional view, then, despite the protestations of the legal 
logicians, did not suppose that practical reason knew its objects with the 
certainty associated with physics or mathematics.  What is good, always is 
particular.  It may in general be good to restore things to their rightful 
owners, but it would not be good to restore a borrowed axe to a now-
insane neighbor.  What is good is learned to be such through trial and 
error, and the experiments take place in the laboratory of life, where things 
are messy and precision is not always possible.  As Aristotle taught, one 
should not seek in an area more precision than it allows.  “Practical reason 
is a leaky vessel,” but, as Glendon has observed, “it’s the one we’ve 
got.”86     
The thesis, then, is this: beneath and generative of the probabilistic 
premises of the common law is practical reason working in its dialectical 
mode.  We inch our way toward “glimpses of truth” about how we ought 
to order our conduct, including through law, to realize goods.  To return to 
my placeholder definition, the common law insistence upon 
reasonableness presupposes “an order that: (1) reason does not make, in 
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the sense that it is not an artifact of our practical agenda; (2) is 
presupposed by legal and moral deliberation, and is brought to light by 
theory and reflection; and (3) is in some way normative for conduct and 
for our legal artifacts.”87    
VI.  NATURAL LAW AS REAL LAW 
Now, before moving on, I want to pause to anticipate several 
possible objections or questions, which in turn will provide a bridge to 
considering natural law in its extraordinary mode of entrance.  The first 
concerns the relationship between practical reason and “the law” we 
practice; the second concerns practical reason’s relationship to natural or 
higher law.   
In tackling the first issue, we can return to Steven Smith’s Law’s 
Quandary.  One aspect of the story he tells about the quandary today 
concerns what people do when, first, they discover that law is not the self-
contained geometry that some sometimes claimed that it was, but then, 
second, refuse to follow Holmes and the Legal Realists to the extravagant 
claim that “law” is simply a cover for the strategic, organized expression 
and wielding of power by another name.  As Smith explains, one popular 
strategy for meeting this challenge has been “law and” – the move to 
supplement or correct the inherited legal materials with the insights of 
other disciplines.  Candidates for this role have included economics, 
policy, philosophy, or even, “practical reason.”88  In the end, Smith rejects 
the “law and practical reason” strategy, and, for reasons to which I now 
turn, I think he is both right and wrong to do so.  
As I have already suggested, individuals turning to precedents, 
statutes, and other sources in order to come to judgment on what the law is 
on a particular point just are looking for distilled practical wisdom, that is, 
they are reasoning about what to do in light of, though not exclusively in 
view of, what has been handed down for the community’s authoritative 
guidance.  If we were to describe this with the help of Venn diagrams, I 
would say, with two qualifications to be introduced in due course, that 
what we have is not practical reason supplementing law, but, rather, law 
itself as a subset of practical reasoning.  Law is that subset of practical 
reasoning that is either promulgated to the community or generated by the 
community itself for itself, and potentially given coercive effect by him or 
them who have care of the community, for the common good of that 
community.   
The first qualification would be that, obviously, sometimes people 
engaged in practical reasoning in law, as elsewhere, draw on the products 
of theoretical reasoning, as when a bureaucrat at the Environmental 
Protection Agency relies on scientific data when drafting a rule regarding 
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treatment of whitefish so as to reduce the risk of botulism.89  The rule is a 
piece of practical reasoning for the good of the potential white-fish eating 
community, and its quality is in part a function of whether the science 
behind it is sound.  Law was never bereft of the learning of theoretical 
reason, otherwise it could not distinguish between, say, night and day, and 
the difference between night and day makes a difference in terms of what 
we should decide to do. 
My reason for rejecting the “law and practical reasoning” strategy, 
then, is that human/positive law already was or is a piece of practical 
reasoning: there’s no “and” about it. 
Smith’s principal reason for rejecting this strategy is different and 
instructive.  Smith concedes that practical reason is at work in law, but 
suspects that what we do in law cannot adequately be accounted for as an 
exercise in practical reason.  Smith points to ways in which some of what 
we do in law is ill-adapted for solving our practical problems.  He points, 
specifically, to the “practical inefficacy of law’s distinctive discourse.”90  
To one scholar’s observation that precedents carry “a wealth of data for 
decision-making” (what I have referred to as distilled practical wisdom), 
for example, Smith replies that there are or might be better ways of 
transmitting apt data for decision-making in law.91  But of course, the 
imperfection of our methods of transmitting data through a temporally 
extended dialectical conversation is not evidence that they not methods of 
practical reasoning. 
Another of Smith’s reasons for rejecting the thesis that what we do 
in law can be adequately explained as practical reason in action is that 
people use practical reason all the time, as “business executives, 
arbitrators, school teachers and principals, coaches, [and] parents,” but in 
no other field do we witness “the specific and extraordinary treatment of 
precedent and text that is so conspicuous in legal discourse.”92  Smith is 
certainly right that law’s methods are unique; but then, our purposes in 
law are sui generis.  Coaches, parents, business executives, whatever their 
authority and responsibility within their respective spheres, have neither 
the responsibility for the common good of all nor the coercive power of 
the state behind them.  The common good’s depending, as it does, on both 
stable rules and the capacity for disciplined, creative adjustment goes a 
long way in justifying the common law method.  And again, the 
imperfection of our legal methods hardly subtracts from their being, in 
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fact, methods of practical reasoning.93  If our memories were better or our 
legal communities small and simple enough, we might get along fine 
without text and with only a limited universe of precedents committed to 
memory.    
Which brings me to the second objection I want to anticipate.  I 
would call it the weak broth objection, and it states simply that practical 
reason, even if one grant all that I have said about it, does not rise to the 
level of law, let alone of higher or natural law.  This is an altogether 
important objection, and my response is to admit the objection.  But this is 
not the end of the matter, because I have not yet given the adequate 
explanation of practical reason that will bring out the element of higher 
law in it.  Practical reason is not its own measure. 
To be sure, you will find many proponents of natural law theory, 
such as John Finnis and those who follow his lead, maintaining that what 
we traditionally refer to as the natural law is – and is less misleadingly 
referred to as – practical reason, with its own non-legal first principles.  As 
I mentioned earlier, Professor Finnis is among those who regard the 
“natural law” as law only in a qualified or analogical sense.94   
The core of the central tradition descending from Thomas Aquinas, 
however, took a quite different view of the matter, specifically that natural 
law is law in the full sense of Aquinas’s definition of law, to wit, an 
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him or them who have 
care of the community, and promulgated.95  And this is because the natural 
law is in us as a participation in the eternal law, that is, the Divine Mind 
providentially disposing all things to their natural and supernatural ends. 
Mercifully, it is not my purpose here to give a full-dress account of 
the metaphysics of the traditional Thomistic doctrine of natural law.96  My 
goal is only to indicate how, in the traditional doctrine, the natural law is 
truly law, and to indicate as much requires the introduction of a few 
scholastic distinctions that will risk exhausting the contemporary reader’s 
patience.  Aquinas’s approach is unlike those that are current today.  He 
does not arrive at his definition of natural law “simply by examining the 
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meaning of the concept of law”97 or baldly asserting—a la Austin—a 
novel definition.  Instead, Aquinas proceeds by attending to “what is 
absolutely first in the order of being.”98   
Doing so, Aquinas discovers the Divine Mind governing the entire 
community of the universe.  God rules irrational creatures solely by 
moving them from potency to act, but his rational creatures he rules both 
by sustaining the inclinations that move them toward their ends and – with 
this we come to the natural law—impressing upon their minds precepts of 
law.99  “By the impression of created light God induces the creature to 
share in the rules and measures of the eternal law.”100  The decisive point 
is this, that practical reason is not ab initio self-norming: the natural law 
has been promulgated within the human practical reason, and it is man’s 
share or participation in the eternal law.   
The weak broth objection thus fails because human practical 
reason is governed by a share in the Divine Mind itself.  God almighty has 
legislated in the human mind.  The natural law is natural in terms of how it 
is received and held in the human mind, but the natural law’s source and 
pedigree are supernatural.   
Furthermore, the precepts of the natural law track and govern our 
given natures.  As Aquinas explains, “the first precept of the natural law is 
that good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided,” and, he continues,  
Since . . . good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature 
of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man 
has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by 
reason as being good, and consequently as objects of 
pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of 
avoidance.  Wherefore according to the order of natural 
inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural 
law.101  
The natural law, then, is a species of divine law that is held 
naturally in the human practical reason, and it legislates that humans are to 
act according to their natures, that is, to do and pursue what is good for 
them.  When natural law is treated as a form of rationalism, without regard 
to the fact that what is legislated is what is good for humans and their 
communities, legalism is the result; when God the legislator is left out of 
the picture of the natural law, there is no lawgiver and, therefore, no 
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law.102  When, however, what God commands is what is by nature good 
for the creature, such higher law is not “now for something totally 
different.” 
Again, this sketch is hardly a complete account or defense of the 
traditional doctrine of natural law; indeed, it is only the most tendentious 
summary.  Still, it is sufficient to my present purpose, which is to explain 
why a commitment to live according to the demands of practical 
reasonableness might – just might – itself be a commitment to higher law, 
whether we recognize it as such or not.  If impressed upon practical reason 
are precepts of divine law, living according to practical reason is not to be 
self-norming but to be (so to speak) normed from above.   
The second qualification I would add to my earlier argument that 
law is a subset of—not an add-on to—practical reason relates to this:  
practical reason can proceed to make law only by judging in conformity 
with the natural law.  The natural law never enters our human living ex 
proprio vigore; it depends, for its entrance into human living, on the 
exercise of practical reason and the antecedent free choice of the will to 
follow the precepts of the natural law.103  Natural law in its ordinary mode 
of entrance is just practical reason working itself out in our contingent 
system of governance, subject to the demands of the natural law.  And 
this, believe it or not, is all part of the divine, providential governance of 
the universe.  To define the natural or higher law correctly is important, 
above all, because it is God’s law.104  
VII.  FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND OUR CONSTITUTION 
I turn now from the ordinary mode of the natural law’s entrance, to 
its extraordinary mode.  I refer to constitutionalism, the project of creating, 
possessing, and giving effect to the fundamental human law of a polity, 
and here my focus will be on the uniquely American problematic of living 
under the written Constitution that was ratified in 1789, and, specifically, 
on the role of the courts in exercising “judicial review.”  In mediating 
among a written constitution, a duly enacted congressional statute, and 
higher law, the courts, apart from the possibility of constitutional 
amendment, have the last word on how, as a matter of human law, we are 
going to live.  To telegraph where I am going, I would say that when the 
natural law enters in its extraordinary mode, it does so on a continuum 
with the ordinary mode.  That is to say, it is the work of practical reason, 
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under natural law, functioning in an historically extended conversation.  
After all, what tools other than practical reason and natural law and 
tradition do we have for figuring out what to do and what not to do? And, 
after all, constitutions are about what to do and what not to do.   
From the Constitution’s being a product of practical reason, 
however, it does not follow necessarily that the Constitution should be 
treated in the same way as our other legal artifacts.  It is obvious that there 
exists a hierarchy among legal materials.  As Chief Justice John Marshall 
famously wrote, “We must never forget that it is a constitution we are 
expounding.”105  But what are we to remember?  Marshall’s own answer is 
not the only one that has been offered.106  Paradoxically, a constitution that 
is brought into being in order to allow the natural law to govern human 
living, can itself become a barrier to natural law’s entry into the positive 
laws.  But this is to get ahead of things.   
As everyone knows, the amended U.S. Constitution enumerates 
certain rights, but these enumerated rights do not exhaust the rights that 
the Constitution is understood to guarantee.107  As one learns in the 
introductory course in constitutional law, the principal vehicle for 
articulating, recognizing, vindicating, defining—it is hard to know the 
correct gerund to name the phenomenon—of unenumerated 
“fundamental” rights by the courts has long been known by the oxymoron 
“substantive due process.”  Once upon a time in American jurisprudence, 
in the era now captured under the epithet “Lochnering,” the nontextual 
fundamental rights sounded in terms of property and economic interests.108  
Today, they include the rights to marry;109 to have children;110 to direct the 
education and upbringing of one’s children;111 to marital privacy;112 to use 
contraception;113 to bodily integrity;114 and to abortion.115  A lower federal 
court recently found a fundamental right to use sex toys.116   
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Plainly, this is a mixed bag, and some will gravitate more toward 
some items in the bag than toward others.  For present purposes, however, 
I am going to stipulate that any constitution that did not recognize and 
protect the liberties to maintain bodily integrity, to marry, to marital 
privacy, to have children, and to direct the education and upbringing of 
one’s children would be pro tanto untenable.  Why?  Such liberties are 
necessary if human persons are to be free to meet the demands of the 
natural law, that is, to pursue the goods commanded by the natural law and 
the conditions necessary for their realization.   
But there is more—or, rather, less—going on here than what I have 
just said about the importance of protecting such liberties for the sake of 
satisfying the demands of the natural law.  The Court does not state its 
claims as I have stated them; the Court does not indicate which liberties 
should be protected and the natural law reasons for protecting those 
liberties.  Instead, with an exception that will shortly swallow the rule, the 
Court talks in terms of fundamental rights.  What we need to inquire into, 
then, is what is the source – the ontological status—of such unenumerated 
fundamental rights. 
The Supreme Court set out to clarify the bases for the recognition 
of a putative fundamental right in the 1997 case Washington v. 
Glucksberg, in which the argument was pressed that the Court should 
recognize the fundamental right of a mentally competent, terminally ill 
adult to commit physician assisted suicide.  “Our established method of 
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2001).  See Angela Holt, From My Cold Dead Hands: The Constitutionality of 
Alabama’s Anti-Vibrator Statute, 53 ALA. L. REV. 927 (2002). 
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substantive-due-process analysis,” the Court explained, “has two primary 
features.”  The Court continued: 
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process 
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and 
liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition,” . . . . and “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed” . . . .   Second, 
we have required in substantive-due-process cases a 
“careful description” of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest.117 
Summing up, the Court stated: “Our nation’s history, legal 
traditions, and practices thus provide the ‘crucial guideposts for 
responsible decision-making,’ . . . that direct and restrain our exposition of 
the Due Process Clause.”118  If a fundamental interest is at issue, a state 
may not interfere with it “at all . . . unless the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”119    
Unsurprisingly, employing this test the Glucksberg Court 
concluded that there exists no “fundamental right” to physician-assisted 
suicide.  On that point Glucksberg is still the law of the land.   
However, a mere six years after Glucksberg, the Court decided 
Lawrence, the case that asserted that Bowers was “not correct” when it 
was decided, and it did so without so much as a mention of Glucksberg.  
How could it, and still come to the same conclusion?  Glucksberg called 
for a “careful description” of the novel liberty being claimed, but in what 
terms would one give a careful description of the right claimed in 
Lawrence? An index of the difficulty of answering the question is the 
following heading introducing the subsection that includes Bowers and 
Lawrence in one of the leading American constitutional law casebooks: 
WHAT SHALL WE CALL THIS SEGMENT – THE 
RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN HOMOSEXUAL SODOMY?  
ADULT, CONSENSUAL SEXUAL CONDUCT IN THE 
HOME?  THE AUTONOMY OF PRIVATE SEXUAL 
CHOICES?  SEXUAL EXPRESSION AND CONTROL 
OF ONE’S BODY?  UNCONVENTIONAL SEXUAL 
LIFESTYLES?  THE RIGHT TO CONTROL ONE’S 
INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS?  THE RIGHT TO MAKE 
                                                 
117 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–721 (1997). 
118 Id. at 721. 
119 Id. 
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CHOICES ABOUT THE MOST INIMATE ASPECTS OF 
ONE’S LIFE?  THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE?120 
Which among these is or are, in the form stated, “deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition,” let alone (because the test is 
conjunctive, not disjunctive), “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” 
such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed?”121 
In the end, Lawrence does not hold that any one of them is.  The 
Lawrence Court held unconstitutional a statute that made it a crime to 
engage in “deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of 
the same sex (a man),” but it did so without saying whether it was doing 
so, first, because there was a fundamental right at issue and the statute 
could not withstand the called-for “strict scrutiny” or, second, because no 
fundamental right was at stake and there was no rational basis for the 
criminal statute.  As Justice Scalia wrote in dissent, “the Court simply 
describes petitioners’ conduct as ‘an exercise of their liberty’ – which it 
undoubtedly is.”122  As would, equally undoubtedly, engaging in 
“prostitution, adult incest, adultery, obscenity, child pornography,”123 
bestiality, the torturing of (innocent) babies, same-sex marriage, and the 
use or distribution of sex toys.   
If we cannot imagine our constitutional regime’s recognizing a 
fundamental right to all nine of these exercises of “liberty,” we have to ask 
on what principled basis the refusal would be made.  Especially in a 
culture, such as our own, that expects “total justice”124 from law, the 
question cannot be evaded. 
VIII.  NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW, AND SELF-DEFINITION 
To return, then, to the question about the source of the fundamental 
rights that vie for judicial recognition as part of our fundamental positive 
law, what I want to suggest is that Lawrence represents, like Casey (of 
which it is, relevantly, merely an application), an end to an authentic 
                                                 
120 CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 489 (10th ed. 2006).  See also Laurence 
H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004).  
121 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–721 (1997). 
122 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003), (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
123 Id. at 598.  
124 “Modern legal culture insists on a single, unified domain of fairness and legality 
and demands a single standard of justice.  To satisfy this demand, every institution has to 
fall into line.”  LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 91 (1985).  See also Hittinger, 
Liberalism, supra note 6, at 441 n.51. 
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jurisprudence of natural rights.125 Lawrence and Casey are not just wrong 
in terms of their specific results: they are wrong inasmuch as they abandon 
the project of identifying and giving legal effect to human rights.  Some of 
this was almost inevitable; some of it was purely willful.  
What I mean by “almost inevitable” is that the attempt to identify 
and spell out natural rights, as such, is an inherently incomplete enterprise.  
Although international declarations of human rights appear with ever 
greater frequency, the ontological status of human rights remains deeply 
and widely contested.  There are philosophers who defend the proposition 
that humans have rights by nature, in the sense that individuals are by 
nature endowed with metaphorical but metaphysically-secure swords and 
shields in aid of their possessors’ progress and protection.  These rights 
are said to be possessions of individual human subjects as such, which is 
why they are sometimes also known as “subjective” rights.  These natural 
human rights—individual or subjective—are said to be parts of the very 
furniture of the universe.126  This is a not-uncommon view.  But the better 
view, it seems to me, is that of Alasdair MacIntyre:   
[T]he truth is plain: there are no such [natural or human] 
rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and 
unicorns.   
The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no 
such rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best 
reason which we possess for asserting that there are no 
witches and the best reason we possess for asserting that 
there are no unicorns:  every attempt to give good reasons 
for believing that there are such rights has failed.127 
                                                 
125 For the post-Griswold history of “privacy” up to 1990, see Hittinger, Liberalism, 
supra note 6, at 457–66.  “[I]n little more than twelve years, the Court transformed 
privacy into an all-purpose natural right of the individual to be emancipated not only 
from statutory law, but also from the ordinary moral and cultural norms.”  Id. at 460. 
126 For an example of this, see the next footnote.  On the notion of “subjective” right 
of an individual, as opposed to “objective” right, that is, what is right/correct under the 
circumstances, see RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES 7–8 (1979); BRIAN 
TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1997). 
127 MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 56, at 69–70. MacIntyre continues:  “The 
eighteenth century philosophical defenders of natural rights sometimes suggest that the 
assertions which state that men possess them are self-evident truths; but we know that 
there are no self-evident truths.  Twentieth-century moral philosophers have sometimes 
appealed to their and our intuitions; but one of the things that we ought to have learned 
from the history of moral philosophy is that the introduction of the word ‘intuition’ by a 
moral philosopher is always a signal that something has gone badly wrong with the 
argument.  In the United Nations declaration on human rights of 1949 what has since 
become the normal UN practice of not giving good reasons for any assertions whatsoever 
is followed with great rigor.  And the latest defender of such rights, Ronald Dworkin 
concedes that the existence of such rights cannot be demonstrated, but remarks on this 
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The reason that the attempt to identify and spell out natural rights 
is, as I say, “an inherently incomplete enterprise,” is that there are no good 
reasons to be believe that “natural rights” are part of the furniture of the 
universe.  Obviously, this point is contestable, but for present purposes I 
simply assert it.128 
I do so because, even if this is so, it does not necessarily follow 
that we should give up (what I have referred to as) “the project of 
identifying and giving legal effect to human rights.”  This is because it 
may be possible to derive natural rights from the natural law.  Though (by 
my stipulation for purposes of the present discussion) natural rights are not 
part of the primordial furniture of the universe, it just may be that they are, 
as I think, derivable from it.  By derive I mean not only that natural rights 
are not inconsistent with the natural law; not only that they can but need 
not necessarily follow as conclusions from the natural law; but, rather, that 
a doctrine of natural rights follows necessarily from the content of the 
natural law.  This is so, I think, because if I say, per the natural law, that 
“it is not good for Brennan to be murdered,” it would seem to be 
equivalent (at this level) to saying, “Brennan has a natural right not to be 
murdered.”  It is not right that Brennan be murdered.   
In other words, “rights” are statements of the right/correct 
relationships among human persons and their communities.  Insofar as 
natural rights describe such relationships between persons considered as 
free moral agents, those relationships are both a product of and subject to 
the whole of the natural law.  Innocent persons have a right to life because 
the natural law establishes that the taking of innocent human life is an evil 
to be avoided, not a good to be done and pursued.  The natural law 
grounds rights; it also conditions them.  One might say that rights are the 
recipient’s view of the relations established by the natural law, and it may 
be useful to speak about the natural law in the terms of the recipient’s 
perspective, that is, in terms of natural rights.129 
But even if this is true, still it is not the end of the matter.  The 
tradition of natural rights discourse stretching back several millennia 
affirms that humans possess certain rights as a matter of higher law; these 
are what the natural law requires.  Though there have been disagreements 
                                                                                                                         
point simply that it does not follow from the fact that a statement cannot be demonstrated 
that this is not true.  Which is true, but could equally be used to defend claims about 
unicorns and witches.  Natural or human rights then are fictions . . . .” RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1976).  
128 For the argument, see MacIntyre, supra note 56, at 66–70. My own exploration of 
the issue is in Patrick McKinley Brennan, The “Right” of Religious Liberty of the Child: 
Its Meaning, Measure, and Justification, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 129 (2006). 
129 This paragraph and the preceding one track closely and in some places paraphrase 
the analysis developed by Bradley Lewis in “Theory and Practice of Rights: Ancient and 
Modern,” __JOURNAL OF LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE __ (forthcoming 2009).  I thank 
Professor Lewis for sharing the article with me in draft form`.. 
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about what these rights are, there has been remarkably much agreement at 
a high level of generality, such as life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of 
happiness.  On the other hand, however, the tradition of natural rights 
discourse has not been content to rest at such a level of abstraction or 
generality.  Nor could it.   
The reason for this is that no one lives – no one has her rights 
vindicated or violated – in the abstract.130  So, for example, the right to 
direct the upbringing and education of one’s children is limited by the 
right of the state to protect the child’s right not to be abused.  The 
engagement of practical reason will come at the level of deciding, say, 
when parental discipline crosses the line and becomes child abuse.  If 
justice is to be done, a judgment will be called for on this question, and 
what we think natural law and natural rights require will be material to 
reaching that judgment.131 
Long is the historical list of those who have tried, at the level of 
theory, to put meat on the bones of human rights.  It includes Roman 
jurists, a host of mediaeval philosophers and theologians and canonists, 
the Spanish scholastics of the post-Reformation period (such as Francisco 
Suarez, Robert Bellarmine, and Francisco Victoria), and in the early 
modern period such names as Samuel Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius, Emer de 
Vattel, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson, and 
many more.  And to this list one would need to add all the twentieth and 
twenty-first century advocates of human rights, both individuals and 
groups, such as the U.N.132  And to all these theorists, one would have to 
add the names of all the judges who have labored, mostly in anonymity, to 
make the natural law and natural rights effective where they matter most, 
that is, in particular judgments.   
By the time Lawrence is over, however, the Court has taken itself 
(and its subjects) out of the millennia-long conversation, with all of its 
sub-conversations, by which persons, groups, and their governments have 
                                                 
130  “No one practically deliberates about, or debates, general values.  . . . .  In the 
real world, we deliberate about values in their particularity – as they conflict with other 
values, or as they are to be ordered according to a hierarchy, situation, or particular 
purpose.”  Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 491. 
131 I say “material,” rather than dispositive, because even a robust theory of the 
natural law such as the one I have suggested does not hold that prudence will not be 
required to resolve matters left underdetermined by the natural law.  It is the “brooding 
omnipresence in the sky” caricatures that would eliminate the need for prudence. 
132 On the history of theorizing about the natural law and/or natural rights, see, e.g., 
TUCK, supra note 126;  TIERNEY, supra note 126; KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW 
AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT (1996); 
MICHAEL BERTRAM CROWE, THE CHANGING PROFILE OF THE NATURAL LAW (1977); LEO 
STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1950); JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF 
MAN AND THE NATURAL LAW (Doris C. Anson, trans., 1943); and FINNIS, NATURAL 
LAW, supra note 48. 
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discerned what rights humans have by nature, which among these should 
be given effect by government through positive law, and in which 
particular configurations.  Lawrence works an evacuation, and in this it 
was only an application of that truly revolutionary idea first advanced by 
the Court in 1992 in Casey:  “At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life.”133  This is the exception that swallows the rule:  
Self-definition supplants discovery of the moral order.  
My immediate concern is not that this position is in error as a 
matter of philosophy or theology, but that it leaves the jurist with too little 
to work with.  It is no wonder that Lawrence did not bother to try to claim 
that there is a fundamental right, or even a right simpliciter, to anything in 
particular.  In a legal universe populated by self-defining people, there is 
no tradition, of natural law and natural rights discourse, to look back to 
with a view toward corroborating, extending, refining, or correcting it.   
Nor is there any predicting what such self-defining folk are going to 
demand next.  “If what the Constitution protects is a general and abstract 
right of making self-defining decisions, then the Court must commit itself 
to the business of vindicating an indeterminate field of individual 
rights.”134  The unworkable result is that   
[t]hrough its judicial organ, government will always appear 
either to be in arrears on the scope of liberty (always 
catching up to latest revisions and concepts of free 
selfhood), or to be arbitrary in the way it sets determinate 
limits (the very purpose of which is to make power 
predictable). . .  [A]s to rights, the Court is caught in a 
perpetual cycle of being over- and under-inclusive.135     
To be adequate to the right, a legal regime would have to be clairvoyant.  
Failing that, “plastic and revisable selves need a plastic and revisable 
law.”136  As Russell Hittinger explains:    
There may well be a kernel of moral truth in the Casey 
dictum, but as it stands the “right” is under-specified.  Until 
it is further specified, no one can know who is bound to do 
(or not do) what to whom.  And so long as that condition 
persists, there is no limit to the government.  On the one 
hand, we have a principle of unbounded individual liberty; 
                                                 
133 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
134 Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 431. 
135 Id. at 494. 
136 Id. at 492.   
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on the other, a government responsible for enforcing that 
principle in a very arbitrary manner.137   
Unbounded government is a perverse and illusory vindicator of personal 
liberty. 
To look at this from another angle, up until Lawrence, those 
seeking to challenge government regulation bore the burden of 
demonstrating that their fundamental rights were being violated, in other 
words, that government was (as I would put it) getting in the way of their 
meeting the demands of the natural law.  Under Lawrence, there would 
now seem to be a “presumption of liberty,” with the result that, where 
there is a plausible claim to an exercise of liberty, government must justify 
the regulation.138  But, according to its own profession, the Court is 
without resources to do so, because, as it said in Lawrence (quoting 
Casey): “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our 
moral code.”  
To be sure, this idea, of defining liberty without making moral 
judgments, is incoherent and unworkable – and that is exactly the point 
that needs making. It is not possible “to define the liberty of all” without 
making judgments that are moral, that is, about what should or should not 
be done.  And this just is the perennial domain of practical reason and 
natural law.  In the same breath with which it claimed not to be reaching 
moral judgments (“not to mandate our moral code”), the Lawrence Court 
enacted sub silentio its preferred moral theory.  No rational person can fail 
to see that a vindication of liberty still requires distinguishing it from 
license; the “liberty” to torture (innocent) children is not going to be 
conferred as a matter of legal “right,” no matter how “essential” someone 
may think it is to her self-definition.   To take a recent example, in arguing 
for “boundless respect” for individual conscience and consequent liberty, 
Martha Nussbaum quickly adds:  “this principle does not imply that all 
religions and views of life must be (equally) respected by government. . . .  
If people seek to torture children . . . citing their religion as their reason, 
their claims must be resisted even though they be sincere.”139  In sum, “no 
one will consent to have their freedom bound in the civil order by 
someone else’s idiosyncracies.”140   
                                                 
137 HITTINGER, FIRST GRACE, supra note 96, at 130. 
138 Randy Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 35–36 (2002–2003). 
139   MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S 
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 19, 24 (2008). 
140 Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 490.  Hittinger continues:  “To be sure, we 
may tolerate each others’ idiosyncrasies, but this is not the same thing as being legally or 
morally bound to do so.”  Id. 
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In distinguishing between liberty and license/idiosyncrasy, the 
Court not only adopted the harm principle,141 but also preferred a 
remarkably narrow definition of harm and causation. 
In Lawrence . . . the Court in effect held, in agreement with 
and at the urging of the libertarian Cato Institute, that the 
Constitution . . . enact[s] John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.  
The result, if consistently followed, would be to presume 
unconstitutional all laws limiting “liberty,” i.e., 
substantially all laws, and put on the states or national 
government the burden of justifying them.  As a corollary 
of this philosophic position and illustrating its potential, the 
Court explicitly rejected traditional standards of morality as 
a means of meeting the government’s burden of 
justification.142    
One reason we (presumably) cannot imagine our constitutional 
regime’s recognizing a fundamental right to all nine of the acts mentioned 
above is that at least some of them violate the harm principle (which is 
now the unwritten moral “law” of the land) as well as other moral 
doctrines that now have been excluded from constitutional 
jurisprudence.143  Instead of giving moral reasons, the Court pretends that 
it flies above morality—but in the belly of the plane a theory of morality 
that is inconsistent with natural law and natural rights is smuggled in.  The 
                                                 
141 Here is the classic formulation of the harm principle by John Stuart Mill:  “The 
object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely 
the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control . . . .  
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-
protection.  That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”  JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport, ed., 1978) (1859).  Although Mill 
himself later adopted a more complex version of the principle (that led to “a blueprint for 
a highly regulated society”), liberal theorists starting in the 1950s revived the original 
formulation.  See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 121–23 (1999). 
142 Lino Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philosopher-Kings Adopt Libertarianism 
as our Official National Policy and Reject Traditional Morality as a Basis for Law, 65 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1140 (2004).  As a side point, one might note that, ironically, just as 
the Supreme Court was adopting the simple version of the harm principle, others were 
realizing its inability to do the work being asked of it.  “The original harm principle was 
never equipped to determine the relative importance of harms.  Once a non-trivial harm 
argument has been made, the harm principle itself offers no further guidance.  It is silent 
on how to weigh the harms, balance the harms, or judge the harms.” Harcourt, supra note 
141, at 193. 
143 On the traditional principles of the criminal law, see ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING 
MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1993); Kyron Huigens, Virtue 
and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423 (1995). 
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harm principle is just as much a moral theory as the one developed by 
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics or the one developed by Immanuel 
Kant in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, only it is deeply 
impoverished. “The absence of legislative power is established by the 
right of the individual to be self-norming. . . .  The individual . . . is under 
neither a higher nor a lower law, but is a law unto himself.”144 
As I said at the outset, taken for all it is worth, a right to self-
definition is limited only by the human resources for self-destruction.  But, 
to borrow a familiar phrase from another context, the Constitution is not a 
suicide pact.  By focusing attention on the traditions of the American 
people, Glucksberg had been an attempt to stave off this result, which had 
been foreshadowed by Casey:  The American moral tradition is not simply 
Millian.  But if, therefore, Glucksberg is to be commended for refusing to 
allow the Court unilaterally to promote its own preferred moral theory (to 
the exclusion of other strands in the tradition), we should notice that 
Glucksberg is itself a symptom of our collective problem.  The Glucksberg 
opinion says nothing about the existence of natural law or the natural 
rights that derive from it, nothing about what humans are and what is good 
for them, nothing about anything with ontological punch.145  The 
Glucksberg test is positivistic, in the sense that it takes our society’s given 
morality as far as we can go for purposes of legal justification—there is, in 
other words, no possibility of having a conversation about what is in fact 
good for humans to do.  Lawrence promptly made Glucksberg its prey146, 
but Glucksberg had already rendered human rights prey to the contingency 
of the past.  Under Glucksberg, the source—and limit—of our rights is 
what our history happens to give us. 
But one would not want to press this criticism of Glucksberg too 
far.  For the reasons developed above,147 the opinion’s unwillingness to 
call attention to the pre-historical, ontological status of rights was an 
exercise in prudence; its refusal to leap to an imagined ahistorical meeting 
with the objects of its inquiry was a piece of moral realism.  We never 
stand face to face with the natural law or natural rights in all their 
resplendence; as I have argued, knowledge of the natural law and rights 
enters historically, in the same history as the one in which we do our 
deliberating and deciding.  History and tradition, though not the last word, 
                                                 
144 HITTINGER, FIRST GRACE, supra note 96, at xxxii.  Some of the remote 
philosophical and theological sources of sovereign, self-defining selves are developed in 
JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, SOVEREIGNTY: GOD, STATE AND SELF (2008) (The Gifford 
Lectures). 
145 Smith, Glucksberg, supra note 20, at 1589–91.  
146 “[T]he rejection of the Glucksberg test [in Lawrence] is not only unacknowledged 
and unexplained, but it is a total rejection.”  Nelson Lund and John O. McGinniss, 
Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1579 (2004). 
147 See supra sections II-IV. 
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are our point of entry to knowledge of whatever is not historically 
contingent. Though the tradition may stand in need of correction and 
revision going forward, these will not be possible if we live every day, as 
Descartes set out to do, as if it were our first.  The dialectical argument 
must go forward, the conversation must bring the past to bear in order to 
face questions about the future in an informed way.   
The question is how to discipline and guide inquiry when novel 
questions of natural law and right are pressed, a question on which the 
Glucksberg Court considered itself incompetent to offer any guidance. I 
have suggested that the common law method of dialectical reason adding a 
layer of intelligence is the ordinary road to giving temporal effect to 
natural law and the natural rights that derive from it.  “[A]judication under 
the Due Process Clauses is like any other instance of judgment dependent 
on common-law method, being more or less persuasive according to the 
usual canons of critical discourse.”148  One cannot, I think, rule out a 
priori that there will be moments when genius or prophetic intervention 
will prompt conspicuous strides forward (or what appears to be forward), 
but these will be the exception.  Natural law and the derivative natural 
rights are about what is good for individuals and their communities, and 
the discoveries of goods are ordinarily the deliveries of temporally 
extended discussions that can engage, as necessary, in a process of self-
correction.  “Natural or fundamental rights [are] not derived by a kind of 
Cartesian reasoner who only consults his own mental geometry,”149 as 
Justice Douglas demonstrated he understood in Griswold:  
We deal with a right of privacy other than the Bill of 
Rights: older than our political parties, older than our 
school system.  Marriage is a coming together for better or 
for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
being sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of 
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a 
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is 
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our 
prior decisions.150 
                                                 
148 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 769 (1997). (Souter, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (discussing and endorsing the rationale of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. 
Ullman). 
149 Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 452.   
150 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).  The Glucksberg Court 
formalized and organized an approach to “tradition” for purposes of deciding what rights 
to recognize under the “substantive due process” heading.  However, for the reasons I 
have developed, tradition is ordinarily the only – not just one possible – source of insight 
into the rights that people by nature possess, assuming that the object of inquiry via 
tradition is what precedes tradition, to wit, natural law and natural rights.  Until recently, 
it went without saying that tradition was the courts’ entrée to resolving novel questions 
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IX.  SPEAKING THE NATURAL LAW 
My argument has been that what we do in creating, sustaining, and 
developing a legal system is, ought to be, and ought to be understood to be 
the work of discovering and making effective, in our common and 
individual living, the natural law and the natural rights that derive from it.  
That work falls variously to citizens who elect legislatures, legislators who 
draft and pass laws, administrators who implement such laws, and so 
forth.  And it will also fall to judges, those whose work has been my 
principal focus in this Article, in various modes, including “common law” 
judging, statutorily prescribed judicial review of administrative action, 
and, most conspicuous, the judicial recognition of unenumerated human 
rights in the exercise of constitutional judicial review.   
But in arguing that the judicial office should be both created to be 
and understood to be a contributor to the project of making the natural law 
effective in our living, I do not invite a free-for-all.  For government to be 
subject to the natural law alone, and to no intermediate laws, “is the core 
of political absolutism or tyranny.”151  I have argued that at every point the 
exercise of the judicial function should be, as I have put it, porous to pre-
positive law sources, but I have stressed that the question of “how porous” 
is not to be answered by consulting a Platonic Form.  But how, then, are 
the metes and bounds of the judicial office to be determined?  A complete 
answer to this question would require more space than I have available 
here, but a suggestive, skeletal answer will serve to draw the threads of my 
argument together.  The answer lies in the people’s duty of self-
governance. 
                                                                                                                         
regarding rights.  The Court’s recent, more self-conscious attention to tradition has 
generated an interesting, largely critical literature.  Judge Michael McConnell commends 
a tradition-minded approach (as opposed to freewheeling philosophical approach), but 
perhaps McConnell’s analysis suffers from insufficient attention to what precedes 
history.  See Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of History, 
1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 668 (1997).  Likewise, Justice Scalia’s adherence to the 
narrowest possible tradition with respect to a proposed right (see Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)) begs the question as to whether the inherited position is the 
result of reasoning or, say, prejudice.  See J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the 
Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1615 (1989); Laurence Tribe and 
Michael Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 
(1990).  Cf. David M. Wagner, The Man Who Declines to Be Socrates: Justice Scalia, 
Truth, and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 473 (defending the 
Court’s position on MacIntyrean grounds, but concluding, pace the analysis of the 
present Article, that our courts have no role in developing tradition).  On what the 
Glucksberg Court was trying to accomplish by hide-bound refuge in tradition and 
formalism, see Smith, Glucksberg, supra note 20, at 1589–91.     
151 JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 31 n.12 (1951). Justice Scalia puts it 
this way:  “[A] rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable 
tradition, is no rule of law at all.”  Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989).  
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One of the recurrent missteps in the contemporary jurisprudential 
battle between liberals and conservatives about the judicial function is 
bald assertion—from both sides, though with different content—about 
what judges can and cannot properly do.  It is the baldness of the 
assertions that is the principal trouble.  To take a leading example, Ronald 
Dworkin has famously developed a theory of an ambitious judicial role, 
but he has done so without apparent regard for the possible difference 
between the federal judicial role, on the one hand, and the respective 
judicial roles of the fifty states, on the other.152  These roles have been 
created by different bodies politic, at different times, and, at least 
potentially, for different purposes.  The created roles may in fact turn out 
to be the same, but determining what the respective roles are would be, I 
maintain, a matter of determining what the people who set up those 
various governments in fact did.   
I maintain that this is the question – what the people have in fact 
done – because, as nearly everyone in our culture believes, the people are 
possessed of a right to engage in self-government.  Discharging their right 
to govern themselves, the people create structures of governance that 
necessarily include offices.  What the metes and bounds of those offices 
are, is a question of what the people decided.  As Paul Bator has 
explained, “The judicial power is neither a Platonic essence nor a pre-
existing legal classification.  It is a purposive institutional concept, whose 
content is a product of history and custom distilled in the light of 
experience and expediency.”153  The question presented, in figuring out 
what given judges can and cannot do (as a matter of constitutional law), is 
the question of how wise and smart the framers have in fact been.  Not all 
framers or groups of framers are created equal, but it would be a 
usurpation of the people’s common right for individual judges or courts to 
take more (or less) than the people had allotted to them.154 
This is one part of the equation, what follows from the people’s 
right to govern themselves.  The other part, which is the part that is more 
readily overlooked, is ontologically prior: the people’s undoubted right to 
govern themselves derives from—and is therefore governed by—the 
natural law.  The right to self-government is not an exception to the 
                                                 
152 Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law, supra note 85, at 322–23. 
153 Paul Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative 
Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 264–65 (1990). 
154 “Obedience to properly constituted authority is not a mere side-piece of the higher 
law tradition.  Positive law tells us who has authority under specific institutional 
constraints.  Therefore, whether any branch or officer of government has usurped 
authority is a question of positive law.  But usurpation is forbidden by the natural law.  
Presumably, this is why the Constitution does not have to include a precept forbidding its 
officers from transgressing the positive law.”  HITTINGER, FIRST GRACE, supra note 96, at 
xxxvii.   
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derivative status of natural rights vis-à-vis the natural law.  It is because 
the people are under a duty to obey the natural law that they are both 
required to and competent to set up government: required, because the 
duty to live by the natural law is not delegable, and the natural law itself 
does not include all the legal content, let alone the enforcement 
mechanisms, that are necessary to successful human living; competent, 
because the natural law gives them a standard of judgment that assures the 
possibility that their governance can avoid arbitrariness by being legal.155    
I should elaborate this last point, about avoiding arbitrariness by 
being legal, because it really is the heart of the matter.  On the natural law 
account that I sketched above, every human being is possessed of a real 
law—the natural law—according to which he can reach legal judgments.  
Moral judgments, whether by individuals in private capacities or by 
individuals in public office, have the potential—the exigence—to be in 
accord with law.  By returning to the insight that morality itself is legal, 
that the natural law is real law, we will be saved from the worry that 
judicial introduction of morality into law is inevitably a legally 
ungoverned enterprise.156  Equipped with a real law according to which 
they can reach judgments, the people need not be the victims of official 
arbitrariness or institutionalized self-definition; they can and should call 
for rule according to the natural law.  And, one might add, if they are 
forced to live under a regime that is characterized by arbitrariness, “law” 
that represents a gross or systematic deviation from the natural law, they 
will possess, under that same natural law, a legal, ontologically rooted 
ground of resistance, perhaps even revolution.157 
Prescinding from the situation of revolution, different peoples and 
their respective cultures will reach different decisions about how to make 
the natural law effective in their living, and, as I have already argued, the 
first question for a sitting judge will be what decisions the people, in 
setting up (or later amending, in the required way) their government, made 
regarding the judicial office.  To the extent that the people left the judicial 
way open to the natural law, then it will be a question of discretion or 
                                                 
155 “The right of the people to govern themselves proceeds from Natural Law: 
consequently, the very exercise of their right is subject to the Natural Law.  If Natural 
Law is sufficiently valid to give this basic right to the people, it is valid also to impose its 
unwritten precepts on the exercise of this same right.”  MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, 
supra note 151, at 48. 
156 See, e.g., SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 13–44 (1990) (arguing that constitutional interpretation is a political, not a 
legal, act).  Cf. Dean Alfange, Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of 
Judicial Review, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 342–49 (arguing the opposite). 
157 HITTINGER, FIRST GRACE, supra note 96, at xxvii (“The individual’s rightful 
liberty vis-à-vis society derives from the proposition that the individual is already under 
another jurisdiction.”).  See also 2 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Natural law as subversive: the 
case of Aquinas, in SELECTED ESSAYS 41, 49 (2006).   
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prudence on the part of the judge or court.  But, drawing upon the 
argument of the early part of this Article, I want to make a further point, 
which goes to why, in general, it will be wise for people to set up judicial 
offices that, at least to some extent, allow judges “directly to speak the 
natural law.”158   
By “directly to speak the natural law,” I mean exactly that judges 
should be allowed to make law (in accordance with the natural law and in 
the way delimited by relevant positive law), and the principal reason is 
that, at least ordinarily, judges will be in a better position to engage in the 
dialectical argument by which the natural law can be discovered and 
implemented.  Of course, at the level of human biological potential and 
limit, legislatures and the legislators that constitute them are in the same 
epistemic boat as judges are in: the leaky vessel that is practical reason.  
No more than a seat on the bus does a seat on the bench give the seated 
one special access to moral truth.  But there are better and worse 
conditions in which to use and develop practical reason, and the typical 
judicial circumstances fall on the better end of the spectrum.   
The reason for this is complex, but the core of it as follows: in our 
legal culture, judges, unlike legislators and legislatures, are required to 
give reasons.  It is true that legislators often give explanations for what 
they are up to in proposing or supporting legislation, but there is little by 
way of culture that demands that their reasons be argued rather than 
asserted.  Legislators can often get by with progandistic, half-hearted 
explanations for their decisions.   As Vining observed, legislation is “the 
arbitrary that we allow – but limit.”159  Judges have the last word, and, in 
our legal system, they must ordinarily give words and arguments in favor 
of that last word.  All of which underlines the point that judges’ words—
their reasons—must be given both honestly and out of respect for the 
judicial office and tradition of this culture.160  Sometimes judges fall short, 
and sometimes they are criticized for their failures.161  Glucksberg worried 
                                                 
158 This phrase, which I have used throughout, is from HITTINGER, FIRST GRACE, 
supra note 96, at 83. 
159 VINING, supra note 43, at 253 
160 Some of the best of this considerable literature are H. JEFFERSON POWELL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION (2008); 
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
(1993); JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE EDGE OF MEANING (2001); JAMES BOYD WHITE, 
LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE (2006).  See also KEITH E. 
WITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (2007) 
(discussing the political construction of judicial responsibility to maintain the 
Constitution). 
161   See WHITE, LIVING SPEECH, supra note 160, at 74–75 (“As for judges, the need 
to be present in one’s speech and writing is even more crucial, for there are serious public 
consequences.  The judge who simply articulates phrases, concepts or ideas in an 
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that judicial “‘guideposts for responsible decisionmaking . . . are scarce 
and openended’”162 in the context of unenumerated rights. But this would 
be true only in the abstract.  Tradition offers the starting points of many 
and sometimes competing arguments from which to add a layer of 
intelligence.163  If this sounds banal, it’s the banal that we are or can hope 
to be.    
CONCLUSION 
To the conservative worry that the risk of judicial manipulation of 
the natural rights inquiry is sufficient reason to deny legal appeals to the 
natural law in the judicial process, I reply that that such a denial will 
inevitably eventuate in a barrier to the basic project of making the natural 
law effective in our human living.164  No written instrument can be 
complete or exhaustive of the scope of the natural law that we come to 
know only incrementally.  Nor is it enough to say that the people can 
amend the Constitution.  As Aquinas notes, the act of judgment is “like a 
particular law regarding some particular fact,”165 and, consistent with the 
concomitant demands for predictability, stability, accountability, and non-
usurpation, judgment should be as right as our reasoning powers will 
allow.  Again, “law is evidence of belief far stronger than academic 
statement and introspection can provide,” and what it reveals is that, 
though it has been a question of degree and kind, there has never been a 
time when American constitutional decision-making has been immune to 
the claims of natural law and natural rights.  In the words of the first 
Justice Harlan:   
                                                                                                                         
unmeaning way can likewise not be attended to, for he is not present as a mind or person.  
This means that his opinion cannot be read with the care and attention lawyers are trained 
to give authoritative texts in the law; it means, too, that he in a real way cannot be 
responsible for what he is doing.  This kind of writing, to use the distinction made 
prominent by my colleague Joseph Vining, is authoritarian, not authoritative.  It is part of 
what Simone Weil would call the empire of force.”). 
162 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. City of 
Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). 
163  Justice Cardozo captured the process as well as anyone:  “[I am not] concerned 
to vindicate the accuracy of the nomenclature by which the dictates of reason and 
conscience which the judge is under a duty to obey, are given the name of law before he 
has embodied them in a judgment and set the imprimatur of the law upon them.  I shall 
not be troubled if we say with Austin and Holland and Gray and many others that till then 
they are moral precepts, and nothing more.  What really matters in this, that the judge is 
under a duty, within the limits of his power of innovation, to maintain a relation between 
law and morals, between the precepts of jurisprudence and those of reason and good 
conscience.”  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 133 
(1922).   
164 HITTINGER, FIRST GRACE, supra note 96, at xxxv (“The default positivism of the 
political Right is at odds with its commitments on many other issues.”). 
165 Id. at 75. 
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[T]he courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so 
restrained by technical rules that they could not find some 
remedy, consistent with the law, for acts, whether done by 
government or by individual persons, that violated natural 
justice or were hostile to the fundamental principles 
devised for the protection of the essential rights of 
property.166 
Evidence of what we do in law is evidence far more probative than what 
we say in law.  And with respect to what we do in law, it remains always a 
question of degree, and perilously.    
As H.L.A. Hart observed some years back, no legal system could 
long survive if it did not give effect to at least a minimum of the natural 
law.167  Hart himself was in favor of making a strong and clear distinction 
between positive law and the natural law (or morality), and, as I have 
stressed, the virtue of not collapsing the distinction between positive law 
and morality is that the conceptual clarity about what morality demands in 
turn allows one a critical perspective on the positive law.168  No 
functioning legal system is perfect, but a legal system that is not calibrated 
to introduce natural law and rights into human living, as circumstances 
allow or require, is unworthy of creatures who are under the natural law. 
This is just the hitch, however—the widespread and expanding 
belief that we have liberated ourselves from the natural law, the source of 
our natural rights.  The natural rights content of our laws is leaking or, 
rather, being squeezed out.  And this is why I have insisted that a recovery 
of the tradition of natural law and natural rights discourse must insist upon 
the claim that the natural law is true, divine law – not just one moral 
theory among many others on a menu from which a selection can be made 
at will.  Brian Tamanaha has worried at length that law as we practice it 
has become a means to an end, a mere tool for bringing to pass people’s 
transitory preferences.169  But what Tamanaha seems not to see is that 
what alone can save this from happening is the possibility, as described in 
this Article, that the creation of positive law is the mandated extension and 
implementation of higher law:  It can be law all the way down, because 
it’s law all the way up.  Formalism, along with the other allegedly non-
                                                 
166 Monongahela Bridge v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 195 (1910) (discussed in 
Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 456 n.128). 
167 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 185–89 (2d. ed. 1994).  As Hittinger points 
out, however, “Hart’s natural law is neither a higher law nor a lower law.  It represents 
those contingent but pervasive aspects of the human predicament which provide the 
background problems and motivations for positive law.”  HITTINGER, FIRST GRACE, 
supra note 96, at xiii. 
168 See SIR NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 160 (1981) 
169 TAMANAHA, supra note 17. 
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instrumentalist possibilities that Tamanaha explores, is itself an “empty 
vessel” that lacks the legal backbone that can arrest the instrumentalist 
slide in its tracks.170     
But if, as I have argued, the solution is a recovery of the traditional 
understanding of the natural law, the question must be faced: Does one 
have to believe in God to know the contents of the natural law?  Aquinas 
thought not; as he saw things, we humans need only know what is good 
for us.  Understanding that the natural law is about what is good for us, not 
merely a legalistic intrusion or a ghostly code of commands, is the key: 
We have privileged access to ourselves and to what reflection upon 
experience shows to be good for us and those like us.   
Aquinas also thought that it was a matter of simple inference that 
God legislates that we must do what is good for us, but few today are 
prepared to make the inference that Aquinas thought was easy.171  Are we 
therefore stuck in Smith’s quandary? Do we, as Justice Scalia suggests, 
need to postulate—or perhaps even believe in—God if we are to have a 
legal system that is porous with respect to the contents of the natural law?   
What I have tried to suggest is that if we are still capable of 
reasoning as our forebears did about what is good for us, then the answer 
is no.  But that is a big if.172  The contemporary scene is long on rights, 
thin on goods.173  As a result, belief in a God who orders us to seek and to 
do what is good just might turn out to be, if you will, the incentive we 
need in order to stop pretending that we are infinitely pliable, self-
norming, self-definers,174 whose lives can be “define[d]” without 
                                                 
170 TAMANAHA, supra note 17, at 1; see also id, at 11–23 (discussing “non-
instrumentalist” views of law).  Tamanaha never pauses to explicate the traditional view 
according to which the natural law is a true law; his discussion of the “Medieval period” 
remains on the level of platitudes.  Tamanaha’s unsuccessful partial longing for non-
instrumentalist law (that is not rooted in higher law) has been aptly described as “esoteric 
legalism.”  Adrian Vermeule, Instrumentalisms, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2113, 2125 (2007) 
(book review).   
171 “Make no mistake—St. Thomas thinks that a human agent ought to know, not just 
by argument, but by simple inference, that moral norms bind by virtue of something other 
than our own mind . . . .   [T]he movement of the mind from the effect (moral truth) to the 
cause (God) is something that, in principle, falls to human reason.”  HITTINGER, FIRST 
GRACE, supra note 96, at 54. 
172  The now-classic denial is by ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 
56, at 263, but MacIntyre maintains that there can be exceptions.  A tradition of 
accountable judicial reasoning might be one.  See id.  But cf. G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern 
Moral Philosophy, 33 PHILOSOPHY: THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF 
PHILOSOPHY 1 (1958) (arguing that it is impossible to do moral philosophy in the present 
age). 
173 See Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 482. 
174 Thereby overcoming John Hart Ely’s dilemma that “there isn’t any impersonal 
value source out there to tap into.”  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 72 
(1980). 
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authority’s making moral judgments.  Belief in God can be hard work, and 
so is self-definition, at least as “difficult as what was required of the homo 
oeconomicus of the nineteenth century to lay transcontinental 
railroads.”175  But is it not easier to believe that there exists a God who 
made friends, play, Biber’s Missa Salisburgensis, puppies, sunrises, 
willing sacrifice, love, lovers, procreation, and every other good thing 
possible in the first place, than it is to believe that there exists, as a 
freestanding feature of the furniture of the universe, a right to use sex 
toys?176  Either way, God help us.177  
 
                                                 
175 Hittinger, Liberalism, supra note 6, at 486. 
176 “It should not be surprising that in a consumer-based economy, individuals come 
to expect large doses of freedom to choose their futures in the fashion of consumers.  If 
the cultural and economic system lay upon us the burden to be rational shoppers – not 
theological enquirers – then it is reasonable to demand the liberty to enact these choices.  
Previous generations of Americans have claimed natural rights to whatever they deemed 
important.  Why should we be any different?”  Id. at 495. 
177 This last sentence is meant to evoke the end of the “prayer” that concludes Arthur 
Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1249 (1979). 
